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Evaluating Forcible Humanitarian Intervention in the Case of Genocide

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ABSTRACT:

When confronted with one of the most terrible atrocities the world has seen, we often see differing reactions from the international community. Genocide has long been a difficult topic to grapple with due to its gruesome nature and its conflicts with sovereignty. Many nations believe to intervene would be to step on the national sovereignty of the country in question, while others believe that in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) we are obligated to intervene in the name of peacekeeping and preservation of life. What remains to be evaluated is the application of the debate for and against humanitarian intervention in such cases. Through research involving personal memoirs from key decision makers, historical accounts of the time, personal interviews, and national laws and treaties, the purpose of this research aims to discover whether the critics of such intervention bear true when responding to the brutality of genocide.
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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION:

One hotly contested instance of the forcible humanitarian intervention debate is the international community’s response to the genocide that took place in Rwanda in 1994. The international community found itself unwilling to be involved in stopping a genocide that was 3.4 times more “efficient” than the Holocaust. Where the Holocaust had a daily death rate of 2,350 victims, the Hutu *genocidaires* managed 8,000 (Svigor 2012). The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was not the world’s first instance of genocide. In the 1870s the “conquest of the desert,” a military campaign led by General Julio Argentino Roca established Argentine dominance over Patagonia and left approximately 1,300 indigenous people dead. Haiti, Mexico, Peru, Australia, New Zealand, France, Ireland, the Philippines, and the Russian Empire have all experienced genocide with varying death tolls in their histories (Naimark, N. M., Göçek, F., & Suny, R. 2011). In April 1915 Ottoman Empire authorities arrested approximately 250 Armenian community leaders as well as prominent citizens. Soon after, the Ottoman military uprooted Armenians from their homes, depriving them of food and water, eventually placing them in the desert of where is today Syria. Massacres of these people were indiscriminate and left between one million and one and a half million people dead. It was this tragedy that led to the coining of the term “genocide” by Raphael Lemkin, giving a name to a crime so heinous one had not existed previously for it (Naimark, N. M., Göçek, F., & Suny, R. 2011). Lemkin presented a draft resolution for a Genocide Convention treaty to several different states, urging them to be sponsors, eventually gaining recognition before the United Nations General Assembly (UNHCR 1901). The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was formally presented and adopted on December 9th, 1948. Not until 1951 did this come into full
force after having the 20th nation ratify it (United Nations 1948). This provided a working definition and a list of crimes all falling under “genocide” to be used by the international community. The working definition and crimes as provided by the United Nations in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 is: any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (United Nations 1948).

These crimes fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, which is governed by the Rome Statute, and is the first treaty based international criminal court established to “help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community” (UN General Assembly 1998). The ICC is independent and not part of the United Nations system. With the international acceptance of a definition of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes the international community succeeded in creating a permanent international court. The Tokyo and Nuremburg trials addressed war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War (UN General Assembly 1998). Similar results to those of such tribunals as the International Criminal Tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda were the results that exemption from guilt is unacceptable, but due to the time-frame and conflict specific nature of those tribunals, the ICC came into being July 17 1998 once 120 states adopted the Rome Statute as the legal basis for establishing the permanent International Criminal Court.
For Rwanda, the international community was at a loss for a decision on how to respond. On one side, should they intervene forcibly overriding the sovereignty of an independent State, Rwanda, to save lives? On the other side, should they allow the genocide to run its course without international intervention? The lack of a unified decision to use forcible humanitarian intervention in this case raises an altogether more pressing question: is forcible humanitarian intervention appropriate for the international community? The critics argue that forcible humanitarian intervention is rarely used for purely humanitarian purposes, that it is often a façade for the next generation of colonialism, that there is no clear “end” for forcible humanitarian intervention, and that it often does more harm than good. Are the numerous criticisms of forcible humanitarian intervention borne out in the case of genocide in Rwanda? To state plainly, was forcible humanitarian intervention appropriate in the case of genocide in Rwanda? To respond to this question, we must first fully understand forcible humanitarian intervention, as separate from humanitarian aid, and its implications, the events of the genocide in Rwanda, understand the international constraints in place during this time, the resolutions passed by the United Nations Security Council, and the manner in which the developed world responded. After doing so an evaluation of the validity of the criticisms of forcible humanitarian intervention can be made.

Forcible humanitarian intervention may be defined as: aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies by force, with or without consent of the state in question. The distinction must be made here that forcible humanitarian intervention implies the use of military force. Characteristics that mark forcible humanitarian intervention different from other forms of foreign assistance and development aid may be the following: it is intended to be governed by the
principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence, reducing national interests governing the action of intervening (Keohane, Holzgreve 2003). Traditional forms of basic humanitarian intervention are the following: material relief assistance and services (shelter, water, medicines etc.), emergency food (short term distribution and supplementary feeding programs), relief coordination, protection, and support services (coordination, logistics, and communications) (Malerba, 2000).

The case of forcibly intervening for humanitarian purposes in genocide in Rwanda is an excellent case to evaluate because of its ambiguous reception by the international community. Once it became clear that genocidal acts were taking place in Rwanda, there was no great push from any international power to intervene and stop the genocide. Regardless of who eventually intervened in Rwanda, it took several months for anyone to do so, and it is worth examining why, and if they were correct to do so at all. The atrocities that took place in Rwanda could well happen again and the international community would be presented with the decision to intervene forcibly or not.

SECTION II:

GENOCIDE AND REALISM, LIBERALISM, AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

To understand the international responses to these atrocities, we must look to the breakdown of European powers interacting in the Rwandan sphere well before the genocide. This includes theoretical approaches for international motivations for response to genocide. As explained by Michael G. Roskin and Nicholas O. Berry nation states behave in certain ways according to various factors largely explained in three main theories: realism, liberalism, and constructivism (Roskin and Berry 1994).
Realism explains that nations will act in the interest of gaining power. Their motivations will reflect the desire to accumulate power in some form. This is also reflected in the arguments against forcible humanitarian intervention. Where there is little national gain, few national interests to protect, or no clear end date, realists would argue against forcible humanitarian intervention. Taking a realist approach to arguing against forcible humanitarian intervention, Daniel Bell and Jean-Marc Coicaud argue that we must focus on the limited funds available for forcible intervention in such an international crisis and we must look at how we can do the most good for the greatest number of people. They suggest that in the effort to achieve fairness across countries, this may be at the expense of fairness across individuals. For example, several nations felt it would be more “fair” to let what could have been presented as a civil war run its course and let the people govern themselves as they wish rather than step in at the first sign of violence and govern for them, simultaneously spending millions and ignoring sovereignty. The United States, for example, was still stinging from involvement in Somalia and did not want another incident to stain their record of international intervention. France, along with several other prominent nations may have thought that by allowing the Rwandan history to run its course, and supporting the party in power through what looked to the outside world to be a military coup by rebel forces; they were achieving the most good for the most people with the hope that they would be able to keep the rebels from threatening peace.

Liberalism explains that nations will act in a certain way because they understand a more just and cooperative world. Liberalists would not be seeking power but instead working to create a safer global environment because it would be what they see as “the right thing to do.” This inversely connects to arguments in support of forcible humanitarian intervention. There is an
ethical standard to uphold, and liberalism would dictate entering a country to protect innocent lives should trump such aspects as national interest.

Constructivism refers to motivation based on specific national identities. This includes political ideology, cultural beliefs, and national standards and traditions. This motivation can be unique to a nation, or a cooperation of several nations sharing common beliefs or ideologies (Betts 1994). Constructivism theory depends heavily on the political ideology and character of the nation in question. For example, Nation A includes foreign aid and humanitarian intervention as a large part of their foreign policy, while Nation B follows a much more isolationist stance in their foreign policy, intervening where national interest is threatened. Nation A would likely intervene forcibly to protect humanity regardless of national gain, while Nation B would not.

ARGUMENTS FOR FORCIBLE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

After examining the previous theories explaining why a state will act in one way rather than another, we can examine more fully the arguments both for and against forcible humanitarian intervention. These arguments as well will affect how a state chooses to respond to international crises such as genocide.

The case for forcible humanitarian intervention will be addressed first. The cases for forcible humanitarian intervention is driven by the premise that it is morally and legally correct to do so by common international law. The sovereign State is expected to act as a guardian of its citizen’s security, but when the State fails to do so, or is itself the cause of the conflict it is assumed to have forfeited its right to that sovereignty (Rieff, D., Tharoor, S., & Daws, S. 2001). This applies to what the United Nations calls “heinous and shocking crimes against humanity” (U.N. 1945), which refers to “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against civilian populations, before or during war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated,” as defined in 1945 in by the United States and other Allies in the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis and the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg (Bassiouni 2011).

Thus sovereignty is not forfeited for every minor infraction, but for cases such as genocide and mass killings, particularly when the killings are carried out by the state, an example of which would be an incident such as the Holocaust 1933 – 1945. Finding the legal need to hold the world accountable to help, the United Nations produced the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948 (United Nations 1948). Key provisions of this convention include the following: the preamble references General Assembly 96(I) and re-affirms that “genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world.” (United Nations 1948). In noting that genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity in all periods of history, the United Nations notes also that international cooperation is required in order to “liberate mankind from such an odious scourge.”

Article I importantly clarifies that genocide can be committed “in time of peace or in time of war,” linking the concepts of prevention and punishment, and implying an international sanction to be brought against the perpetrators (United Nations 1948). Article II defines genocide as a crime of intentional destruction of a national, ethnic, racial and religious group, in whole or in part. This article includes five punishable acts of genocide, including intentional physical destruction of the group in question. Article III adds four additional categories of
genocide, one of which being complicity, though this was virtually implied in the concept of perpetration and derives from general principles of criminal law. This importantly includes those who assist in the perpetration of genocidal acts or allow genocide to take place while standing idle. One of the more controversial provisions in the Convention states that genocide will be punished either by a competent tribunal of the territorial State, or by “such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.” (United Nations 1948). This was contested due to the argument of the necessary impartiality by those sitting on the tribunal, only to have it be upheld that the exercise of universal jurisdiction is authorized by customary international law (Schabas 2013). Due to numerous forcible humanitarian intervention failures, such as the legal dilemma of Kosovo, the genocide in Rwanda, and the humanitarian disasters in Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Canadian government has since produced the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in September of 2000, for the purposes of examining the question of when, if ever, the international community has the right to intervene in a sovereign state in the name of humanitarian intervention (Evans & Sahnoun 2001). This commission included prominent human rights leaders and produced the final report now known as The Responsibility to Protect, with the objective of producing “lessons learned” for the international community. This shifted the question from when the international community has the right to intervene, to who has the right to intervene. This responsibility is naturally first placed on the sovereign state, sovereignty being conditional on providing protection. If the State is unstable or unwilling to protect its population, or if the State itself is the cause of the threat, the international community has the responsibility to protect those populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (Evans & Sahnoun 2001). Threshold conditions, which are conditions that must be met before sovereignty can be breeched by military
intervention, have been outlined by the ICISS in the effort to direct more clearly when international humanitarian intervention is necessary and to avoid further international crises such as Rwanda.

The threshold conditions include high loss of life, right intention, last resort, proportional means, reasonable prospects of success, correct authority granted by the UN Security Council, and clear operational objectives. The World Summit Outcomes overcame the last legal roadblock to forcible humanitarian intervention in 2005 when the UN officially affirmed that it had the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The present legality and framework support a case for a "counter-restrictionist," resting on two prominent legal claims: 1. The UN Charter commits states to protecting fundamental human rights, and 2. There is a right of forcible humanitarian intervention in customary international law. The counter-restrictionist argument cites most frequently Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter. Article 2(4) states “All members shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of force . . . in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,” and article 51 states “Nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs” (United Nations 1945). The counter-restrictionist would argue that so long as there is no ulterior motive, such as intentional seizure of territory, the use of force to intervene for humanitarian intervention purposes is acceptable under the Charter of the United Nations (Bellamy, Williams 2006). The UN Charter addresses the importance of human rights in its preamble, and Articles 1(3), 55 and 56, all pertaining to protection of human rights as one of the principle purposes of the UN system. This implies a humanitarian exception to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter. The case is also made that there is a moral duty to intervene to protect civilians from genocide and mass
killing. There relates to an idea of common humanity, that all individuals have basic human rights and duties to uphold the rights of others. To a further extent, one may argue that today’s world is so globalized and integrated that massive human rights violations in one part of the world have an effect on every other part, also creating moral obligations (Bellamy, A., Wheeler, N. 2001).

ARGUMENTS AGAINST FORCIBLE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

The following six points present arguments against forcible humanitarian intervention:

Humanitarian intervention is often rarely deployed for purely humanitarian reasons. National interest is nearly always a driving factor, and is usually associated with two costs. If the primary interest is geopolitical rather than humanitarian, then force used will be biased politically. If states do intervene for purely humanitarian purposes, they quickly lose interest and leave the country, or simply do not have the capacity to continue an intervention for an extended period of time (Bellamy, A., Wheeler, N. 2001).

It is often seen as a façade for a new era of colonialism; goals of intervention being replaced with those of “civilizing” the third world. This means under the defense of “civilization,” the developed world feels justified intervening in the affairs of the third world that may not be humanitarian in nature at all and simultaneously creating a dependency similar to that of colonization (Bellamy, A., Wheeler, N. 2001).

Breaches of sovereignty in the name of humanitarianism erode the principle of sovereignty created by the Treaty of Westphalia. The Treaty of Westphalia 1648, established a series of peace treaties signed between May and October of 1648 in Osnabruck and Munster, ending the Thirty Years’ War (1618 – 1648) in the Holy Roman Empire. These treaties resulted
from the first modern diplomatic congress, thereby initiating a new political order in central
Europe. The treaty was based on the concept of a sovereign State and has been governing the
world ever since its creation in 1648. The argument here is that a treaty in place for over 300
years should withstand any attempts to diminish it. This erosion comes at two costs: diminishing
the authority of the body best suited to protect the interest of its people and setting a dangerous
precedent for future violations of the principle of sovereignty. If one nation feels a breach of
sovereignty occurred, does that provide justification for intervention, possibly armed, such as
that in Kosovo? A very subjective door is left open when we say that anyone may claim criterion
for the forfeiture of sovereignty has occurred. States such as Russia and China are more than
capable today to intervene where they see fit, and would likely do so if not for their strong non-
interventionist policies currently in place from the Post-Cold War era.

In some cases it is better to let a conflict run its course. Political scientist Edward N.
Luttwak states that “although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve
political conflicts and lead to peace.” Though war may be devastating to a culture or a people, it
may be, in some cases, a way to achieve peace and allow underlying conditions to be resolved
(Luttwak 1999). The key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached. War
brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence. Hopes of military success must
fade for accommodation to become more attractive than further combat. Since the establishment
of the United Nations and the enshrinement of great-power politics in its Security Council, wars
among lesser powers have rarely been permitted to run their natural courses. Typically, they are
interrupted fairly early, before they could establish preconditions for a lasting settlement
(Luttwak 1999). When conflict is halted due to forcible international humanitarian intervention,
the immediate issue is subdued, yet the underlying conditions causing the conflict initially are
left unaddressed, and leaves the state open to falling again to conflict (Bellamy, A., Wheeler, N. 2001).

With regard to the responsibility to protect, once humanitarian intervention is launched, there is no clear end date, flexible to each individual situation. An intervening state does not know how long they will be in country and they do not have any definitive time frame for intervention. Often forcible humanitarian intervention becomes permanent, and more and more costly to maintain, including rebuilding a stable state while supporting the people until a new government is formed.

Forcible humanitarian intervention often does more harm than good. States sometimes do exactly what they are claiming (and trying) to prevent – gross violations of human rights and international law. Once a forcible aspect is introduced to the humanitarian cause, the principle of the matter is changed fundamentally from stopping killing to winning a military operation. When the mindset of humanitarian intervention is changed from stopping the killing to winning a war, the entire premise of the situation is changed, sometimes irrevocably (Bellamy, A., Wheeler, and N. 2001).

III CASE STUDY: RWANDA

*CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF EVENTS:*

1994 saw the explosion of decades of ethnic tension in the small, African country of Rwanda. In approximately 3 months, nearly one million people were massacred in the streets, markets, and marshes all around the country. The Hutu government, Presidential Guard, and
youth militia Interhamwe took up machetes and turned on Tutsi neighbors and friends. It was a genocide that shocked the "civilized" western world, most of whom could not comprehend the primitive actions taking place in the "dark continent." Though the massacres that left people dead in the streets were publicized, foreign opinion chose to turn a blind eye. For many foreign powers, involving themselves in a genocide that threatened no national interest and offered no lucrative return was a very unattractive option. France was the only nation to volunteer to intervene, authorized by UN Security Council resolution 929, and carried out Operation Turquoise under the banner of humanitarian intervention creating a "safe zone" in the southwest region of Rwanda along the border of what was then Zaire. By denying genocide and refusing to call it by its proper name at the time, most international powers were able to avoid involvement until the genocide had all but run its course. When France finally intervened with Operation Turquoise, the genocide had already progressed for approximately two months leaving hundreds already dead.

The genocide for which Rwanda is still known today was neither spontaneous nor elaborately planned. There were common feelings of oppression by the Hutu who had long been second-class to the much favored and prosperous Tutsi. Ethnic conflict between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority had been witnessed in the years before, including instances such as arbitrary arrests and detention of citizens numbering upwards of 8,000, local officials inciting Hutu attacks on Tutsi civilians leaving over 300 dead in October of 1990 in Kigali, and the massacre of over 300 Tutsi civilians carried out by Hutu police, military, and civilians in Kibilira, a prefecture of Gisenyi (Dorn, A. W., & Matloff, J. 2000). Though the rest of the world initially may have not felt intervention necessary, anti-Tutsi propaganda increased until the plane carrying presidents Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi
crashed in the evening of April 6, 1994, triggering full blown massacres throughout the country spreading from Kigali out into the countryside. When many think of genocide, the Holocaust and gas chambers are the first thoughts, but here people were quite literally hacked to pieces in the streets, marshes, and fields by machetes. The industrial element of the holocaust was missing, replaced by much more gruesome techniques. Tutsi were hunted down and killed without mercy. Children watched as their mother’s arms and legs were hacked off and left to die, much more slowly than anyone could imagine. Few, if any, bodies were buried and they were left as evidence that the killers had done as ordered and hunted down former neighbors, schoolmates, or coworkers. The machete was a natural tool to an already agrarian community, and it appeared one step from cutting crops to cutting limbs. Though the rest of the world is nauseated to hear of these atrocities, for hundreds of thousands of Tutsi it was a nightmare that would not end. Many Tutsi survived to live with the shadows of death following them constantly, only to return to life as “normal” with their Hutu neighbors resuming their daily lives as well. They moved home or what was left of what they called “home” and resumed as though the atrocities had not taken place (Hatzfeld 2006). Without closure, this country is haunted not by the “skeletons” in their closet but by those strewn though their streets, schools, and churches (Prunier 1995).

Philip Gourevitch, in his book *We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families*, draws upon the European history of involvement with Rwanda as a platform for his analyses. This begins with colonialism to follow the events of the genocide and the actions of the international community as each event took place. He explains that “race science” was very popular in Europe, where European scientists found themselves looking to science to pinpoint specific differences in races, then choosing one superior to another (Gourevitch, 1998). Gourevitch explains that cartographers at the Conference of Berlin (1885) marked Rwanda and
Burundi as part of the German East Africa, but it was a place so far removed and ignored that little attention was paid (Berlin West Africa Conference 2008). “Even slave traders seemed to pass this place by” and during the Conference of Berlin as Africa was carved up, few if any white men had ever set foot in Rwanda (Gourevitch 1998). Soon after World War I, the League of Nations handed Rwanda to Belgium for rule and management. This did not make it expressly a Belgian colony; rather Rwanda was placed as such under Belgian trusteeship, meaning that Belgium was under international pressure to “get Rwanda ready for independence,” (Gourevitch 1998).

This seemed most easily accomplished for the Belgians by using the natural segregation of the Tutsis and the Hutus already present in Rwanda. Even before German colonization, three ethnic groups existed in Rwanda: the Hutu (85%), Tutsi (14%), and Twa (1%). The Hutu lived more agriculturally while the Tutsi lived raising cattle. The Belgian organization of power then instituted the system of identification cards, designating one Hutu or Tutsi, to be carried at all times. Under Belgium, a new ethnically segregated state, church, and education system emerged, strongly favoring the Tutsi over Hutu. From a Belgian standpoint, the Tutsis were in a minority position, the Hutus being the majority, making it easier to appeal to, bolster, and support the minority in order to maintain control over the majority of the population. The identification card plan ran deeper than intended. Jones (2006) agrees that the institution of the Identification card played a significant role in firing up the emotion and feeling of difference in the population. In no real way are these people different from one another. They share a language, culture, and daily life. After having pushed the position that the Tutsi were a better class of citizen, “taking it back” proved extremely difficult, particularly when Belgium switched its allegiance and support in 1956 to the Hutu power as they drew closer to independence (Jones 2006). Belgium had
managed Rwanda as an oligarchy, rule of the few for themselves, because it benefitted them to do so. Once it became evident that Rwanda was going to become a new, independent, theoretically democratic nation, it benefitted Belgium much more to support those who were likely to win election and hold office: the Hutu.

As Rwanda moved into a self-governing state, the first elections were held in 1962, placing Hutu Gregoire Kayibanda in the presidency. Only eleven years after the first election, more extreme Hutu power took control in a military coup, placing Juvenal Habyarimana in the position of president July 5, 1973. After several peace talks known as the Arusha Peace Accords, held in Arusha, Tanzania, transition to democratic power including a government that comprised both Hutu and Tutsi representatives was installed, still with Habyarimana as president. Far from stability, assassinations took place, and ten Belgian peacekeepers that had been stationed in Kigali during governmental transitions, were captured, tortured, and murdered (Jones 2006). This crossed a tripwire, signaling to the rest of the world that a civil war had begun, and European States pulled their people out, except a few hundred peacekeepers under General Romeo Dallaire, working for UNAMIR.

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

First the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda was established an observer to Uganda/Rwanda by Security Council resolution 846, adopted unanimously on 22 June 1993. The purpose of this mission was to verify the transit or transport, by roads or tracks, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border of Uganda into Rwanda. The undertones of tension in Rwanda were already evident to the international community, eased only slightly by the Arusha Peace Accords. Representatives of the government of Tanzania facilitated these Peace
Talks in Dar es Salaam, concluding the 4th of August 1993, with “a comprehensive peace agreement called for a democratically elected government and provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government” (UNAMIR).

Following a UN reconnaissance mission to Rwanda from 19 to 31 August 1993, UNAMIR officially went into effect after the recommendation to the Security Council by the Secretary-General, for the establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda following several observer missions held in the twenty years since Juvenal Habyarimana took control. This was accompanied by a mandate of “contributing to the establishment and maintenance of a climate conducive to the secure installation and subsequent operation of the transitional Government.” The principle functions of UNAMIR were: 1. To assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali. 2. Monitor the ceasefire agreement, including the establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures. 3. Monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government’s mandate leading up to elections. 4. To assist with mine-clearance. Additionally, UNAMIR would assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations (United Nations 1993).

By 1993 there was a “threefold increase in the number of displaced persons,” quickly overwhelming the local capacity to handle the situation. The “humanitarian response” as provided by the UNAMIR background included facilitating cooperation and ensuring security and safety of NGO/IGO operating in the area. Though several ceasefires were proposed, they were not carried out and UNAMIR in the area played a primarily stabilizing role. When the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi crashed, killing all on board, and generally considered to having “triggered” the genocide, UNAMIR was changed in several ways. After the
brutal torture and killing of the 10 Belgian peacekeepers, the Government of Belgium withdrew its battalion from UNAMIR, the concentration was shifted to political negotiations, protecting civilians, assisting in evacuations, and “providing humanitarian assistance to large groups of displaced persons.” At this point in 1994 UNAMIR personnel numbers were reduced from 2,548 to a mere 270 (United Nations 1993).

The following United Nations Security Council resolutions were passed in 1994 pertaining to Rwanda: 893, 909, 912, 918, 928, 925, 929, 935, and 965. Resolution 893 was passed 6, January 1994 and reaffirms commitment to peace and notes progress implementing the Arusha Peace Accords. It notes increasing violence in Rwanda and finishes with remaining “actively seized of the matter.” Resolution 909 expressed “deep concern” for the delay in establishing the transitional government, and also remains “actively seized of the matter.” Resolutions 912 – 935 do little more than remain “actively seized” and noting continued and escalating violence. Resolution 912 called for increased humanitarian intervention but also introduces the concern for preserving the sovereignty of Rwanda. Resolution 918 introduces an element of self-defense capabilities by UNAMIR forces previously restricted to non-armed peacekeeping. It also importantly imposed an arms embargo preventing the sale or supply to Rwanda weapons or ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts. Resolution 925 notes with “grave concern” reports indicating “acts of genocide” taking place in Rwanda. As UNAMIR was originally intended as a safety and humanitarian measure for displaced persons, it is also noted that they were “not to have the role of a buffer force between the two parties,” essentially leaving highly escalated conflict, mass and systematic killings, without international intervention. Resolution 929, passed the 22nd of June 1994 is of particular importance because it is the resolution that authorized French military
operation: *Operation Turquoise*. Resolution 929 notes “the offer by Member States to cooperate with the Secretary-General towards the fulfillment of the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda . . . and stresses the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an interposition force between the parties.” This was supported by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizing all “necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives set out in the subparagraphs 4(a) and (b) of resolution 925” (UN Security Council 1994).

Resolution 935 was passed July 1st 1994, mid-genocide, and notes again possible acts of genocide, and flagrant violation of international law, “calling upon” the Hutu government to stop the killings. Finally resolution 955, passed 8 November 1994, establishes the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and suggests member states assist in the rebuilding and solidification of a new democratic government (UNSC 1994). This International Tribunal for Rwanda was established for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. It currently has 75 completed cases, including 16 pending appeal and 12 acquitted. Eight of those tried have pleaded guilty and nine of the accused are still at large (UN Security Council 1994). The ICTR is governed by its Statute, and consists of three organs: the Chambers and the Appeals Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor (in charge of investigations and prosecutions), and the Registry (responsible for providing overall judicial and administrative support to the Chambers and the Prosecutor). With the UN Security Council resolution 977 on 22 February 1995, the seat of the Tribunal was established to be in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania. It held jurisdiction in three forms: 1. Ratione Materiae; genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. 2. Ratione Temporis;
crimes committed between 1 January and 31 December 1994. 3. Ratione Personae et Ratione Loci; crimes committed by Rwandans in the territory of Rwanda and in the territory of neighboring States as well as non-Rwandan citizens for crimes committed in Rwanda.

It is also worth noting that the Gacaca courts largely punished those who carried out the genocide. Gacaca was a traditional, informal means of conflict resolution on the village level involving respected village elders and open participation of local residents, used well before the genocide (Magnarella, P. J. 2012). The transitional government that assumed control of the RPF took control of Kigali arrested approximately 120,000 Hutu on suspicion of having been involved in the massacres. Lacking functional courts, qualified judges, and lawyers the government held prisoners without formal indictments for years in poor living conditions (Magnarella, P. J. 2012). In December 1996 Rwanda passed the “Organic Law on the Organizations of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity,” which was broken down into four categories: Category 1 for planners, inciters, and leaders, and for particularly brutal or notorious killings, and acts of sexual torture. Category 2 for authors and accomplices of homicides. Category 3 for assault, and Category 4 for offenses directed at property only. Category 1 was originally punishable by death (but Rwanda has since abolished the death penalty), Categories 2 and 3 could serve up to live in prison, and Category 4 by nominal prison sentences and fines (Magnarella, P. J. 2012). Up to approximately 11,000 Gacaca tribunals were created to deal with the massive amount of those accused of contributing to the genocide.
RESPONSE OF VETO POWERS:

The UN personnel present was sorely understaffed and ill equipped both legally and physically to intervene and could only hold out but so long. Initially Western priests and nuns barricaded themselves in churches to try and protect children and their families but they too could only deter aggression before they were murdered alongside the Tutsi they sought to protect (Melvern 2004). Several foreign powers such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France initially supported a UN delegation going into Rwanda for political stabilization and humanitarian efforts, hoping also to avoid the negative headlines that would undoubtedly be pouring out of the country sooner rather than later and support the UNAMIR staff present. Russia and China came together, maintaining a post-Cold War non-interventionist policy, insisting that the matter should be dealt with within Africa, primarily by the OAU comprising of several neighboring African states, though they voted along with the other 13 member states of the Security Council in passing UNAMIR. May 6th, 1994, brought a UN resolution presented by Spain, New Zealand, Argentina, and the Czech Republic calling for European reinforcement, but stronger and more influential states such as the U.K. and U.S. had come to support the non-interventionist policy of Russia and China who insisted that aid must come primarily from neighboring African states (Melvern 2004). Several nations pointed to embargos to cut off resources from being sent to Rwanda, but two nations present in the Security Council opposed this proposition vehemently: France and Rwanda (McNulty 2000). The comprehensive indecisiveness was then perceived as a United Nations act of stepping away and failing to actually intervene. This indecisiveness would serve as a tripwire signaling to Rwanda that the rest of the world did not care enough to intervene.
ROLE OF FRANCE

Separately from the UN, France began acting unilaterally to intervene. As soon as President Mitterrand, who had a close personal friendship with Juvenal Habyarimana, of France received a call in 1990 that the Tutsi rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), crossed the border invading from Uganda into Rwanda, France sent help to the Hutu regime for the purposes of “stabilization” efforts (Prunier 1995). France proceeded to make contact with Brussels such that “no hard feelings” would occur with France entering their former trusteeship. Brussels responded by sending 400 paratroopers as well as other supplies following the French lead, intervening in the name of forcible humanitarian intervention (Prunier 1995).

A pillar of French foreign affairs had been in favor of humanitarian aid and intervention, and the French have been fiercely proud to see themselves in such a light. The French are a very proud people, and any threat perceived as “Anglo-Saxon” stepping on Francophone toes is a threat of which the French will fight for to the point of recklessness. Prunier discusses the “special relationship” France has with Africa, which may have something to do with a “mixture of old memories, shared material interests, and delusions of former grandeur,” or quite frankly that France considered francophone lands “part of the family” regardless of former colonialism (Prunier 1995). Certainly language and culture were cementing factors, possibly supporting the Fashoda Syndrome; which supports that the world is a cultural, political, and economical battlefield between the French and the Anglo-Saxons (Prunier 1995). Dating back to 1898 and the Fashoda incident in the Sudanese village of Fashoda, the theory exists that the French have been vigilant in guarding against Anglophone encroachment in what is considered francophone territories. The Fashoda Syndrome has since formed a cornerstone of France’s African policy, with the French presidential office in the Elysée containing a special Africa Unit (Cellule
Africaine) known to cover anything from intelligence work to bribery (Meredith 2006). Whether this Anglo-Franco competition exists in reality or simply in the minds of the French is unclear. This raises the question however of whether or not this changes how we see the forcible humanitarian intervention on the part of the French, given their unclear intentions and already close relationship with Rwanda.

In the case of genocide in Rwanda, the UN Security Council approved French Operation Turquoise by resolution 929, to establish a “safe humanitarian zone” in southwestern Rwanda, in response to mass killings and ethnic violence (UNSC 929). President Mitterrand was pushed to the decision to sign off on Operation Turquoise after a compelling speech from Nelson Mandela at the June 13th Tunis meeting of the OAU, in which he called the genocide a “rebuke to Africa,” and insisted that something be done by the more capable Western world (Prunier 1995). The politics of France were divided in the summer of 1994, and some saw the desperate plea to “help the chopped up African babies” as an attempt to gain public approval ratings – which it did, as the polls of public support of French force deployment had risen drastically (Prunier 1995). The French people were overwhelmed by a sense that humanitarian action must be taken, particularly in a state with which they shared their French language. The situation proved more and more dismal as French forces arrived on Rwandan soil, where they found few if anyone left to save. Their humanitarian cause was failing, leading the rest of the world to suspect ulterior motives.

The more involved the French became involved the more apparent it was that their aims were not purely humanitarian, providing evidence for the arguments and critics against forcible humanitarian intervention (Cohen 2007). As French forces entered Kigali, they were greeted by cheering Hutu crowds who were under the impression that their “back up” had arrived, a highly embarrassing situation for France who had been telling other global powers of how they wanted
solely to champion the humanitarian, peaceful cause (Prunier 1995). Sadder still was the fact that as the French “Tri-Coulour” was raised at a makeshift command center for the French forces, many Tutsi came out of hiding thinking they were saved and their nightmares were over, only to be shot on the spot or captured by Hutus in the streets (Prunier 1995). Furthermore the announcement of French troops pouring into Rwanda undermined almost completely the work of Canadian UN General Dallaire, who had been working in Rwanda the entire time, well before France “decided to show up” (Melvern 2004). Dallaire calls the French intervention “nothing more than resurgence in the genocide” as evidenced by the so-called “safe-zones” created by France in the southwest corridor of Rwanda. Though intended to harbor relief efforts and protect genocide victims, it proved more to be a safe hideout for the perpetrators, and a way to smuggle them into neighboring Zaïre (Melvern 2004). This operation would prove to be a defining factor in all of France’s interactions in Rwanda. The safe corridor was set up and manned with French troops, yet somehow the killers and the leaders of the genocide were escaping responsibility and judgment, and leaving the country all together.

Interestingly *Operation Turquoise* was not at all the first of French interaction in Rwanda. Daniel Domergue explains in his book *Coopération et Interventions Militaires en Afrique: La Fin d’une Aventure Ambiguë?* (Military Cooperation and Intervention in Africa: the End of an Ambiguous Adventure?) that from the 1960s on, France had in place a number of “defense agreements and covenants covering military and technical assistance” which allowed France to “guarantee defense, equip armed forces, and intervene where necessary on Rwandan soil” (Domergue 1998). Domergue and Olivier Lanotte agree that it is precisely this intervention that has received harsh criticism in post-genocide years. Domergue proposes that France has intervened primarily where their “interests” were indeed threatened, leading African leaders to
use these treaties with France as a means to ensure that they remained in comfortably in power (Domergue 1998). This allowed both parties to use each other for less than ethical reasons, for example using France to supply Hutu génocidaires with arms and training.

More and more the Western world saw the genocide as “Tribal” and as though foreigners were powerless to help (Melvern 2004). Though these feelings were prominent among Western states, they are quite plainly incorrect. It has been stipulated by Michael Barnett, and agreed with by Oliver Lanotte, “France was up to its neck in Rwanda, providing not only military assistance but also training to those who committed genocide. It is unknown whether France was forewarned about the genocide, but there is little doubt that they did have good reason to suspect something much more than a civil war,” leading us to draw the conclusion that something could have been done differently (Barnett 2002). At no point did France ever try to disarm the Rwanda army or génocidaires (those who committed genocide), as they fled to various “safe” French areas (Barnett 2002). Melvern, Jones, and Prunier have also agreed upon this point. Several instances had arisen in which the French may very well have had other options, yet they appeared blinded by a “French Pride,” and an effort to restore former Gaullist grandeur. The fear existed that if they did not intervene, an Anglo-Saxon country would, leading more francophone territories to fall. There seem to have been several pre-existing factors that allowed Rwanda to fall under the terror of genocide, most of which may be traced back to the European sectioning off of Africa. The exploitation that followed colonization stunted the development of those nations, and though France did not colonize Rwanda, the concept of a francophone world appears to be such a strong motivating factor that several aspects that would have normally been taken into consideration (such as the ever rising death toll) were overlooked and hidden from public eyes.
In recent years (2010 – 2014), several Franco Rwandan talks have taken place in Paris, showing current efforts to amend the past blunders between the two nations. Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2010, was the first French president to visit Kigali since the genocide, stating at a press conference: “What happened here is unacceptable, but what happened here compels the international community, including France, to reflect on the mistakes that stopped it from preventing and halting this abominable crime,” (BBC 2010). The rift between France and Rwanda is likely to take much longer to heal, as the language of instruction in Rwandan schools has been changed to English from French and Paul Kagamé, current president of Rwanda, appears determined to move the country away from francophone ties. Rwanda has since joined the Commonwealth – which is a group almost exclusively comprised of former British colonies. Though Sarkozy has shown efforts to repair diplomatic relations with Rwanda, France is still home to several senior Rwandan genocide suspects avoiding trial (BBC 2010). If we are to learn anything from history, we can take these negotiations as a sign of progress and cooperation, but we can never know for certain how France would handle such an international cataclysm again, given the outcome of their forcible humanitarian intervention seeming to only prove the critics right.

RESULTS:

Given the data provided by the United Nations and evidence provided by the case study, we may evaluate the arguments against forcible humanitarian intervention.

1. Forcible humanitarian intervention is rarely carried out for purely humanitarian purposes. United Nations reports and Security Council resolutions pertain primarily
to humanitarian intentions. This is consistent with the purpose of the United Nations, ensuring global cooperation and peace. The French *Operation Turquoise* however has become highly controversial for French involvement in the genocide. The further France progressed into Rwanda; the relationship France had with francophone Africa became increasingly apparent to be non-humanitarian. Hopes of restoring former global influence seemed to be driving the French initiatives in keeping a government in power that was in French pockets for decades (Macridis, R. C., & Aspaturian, V. V. 1967).

2. Forcible humanitarian intervention presents a façade for a new era of colonialism. The United Nations intention of intervention appeared to be supportive of forming a transitional, stable, government of Rwandans. The military operation carried out by the French, *Operation Turquoise*, showed signs of propping up the Hutu government with whom the French government had long been close with personally, and those who led the genocide, in doing so increased a dependency of Rwanda on France, thereby perpetuating dependence and maintaining the francophone family in Africa (Macridis, R. C., & Aspaturian, V. V. 1967).

3. Breaching sovereignty erodes the principle of sovereignty. The forcible humanitarian intervention in Rwanda set precedence for other such international crises that when mass killings and widespread violence are occurring, the international community will not intervene, and when they do it will be late, and potentially unhelpful. Sovereignty here was placed above the protection of innocent life. The manner in which the United Nations progressed first with observer missions and peacekeepers before finally authorizing military action by France demonstrates the dilemma
created by sovereignty issues. The unwillingness of the United Nations to support any action violating sovereignty demonstrates how important this argument against forcible humanitarian intervention is. If the sovereignty of Rwanda was completely disregarded in this instance, one possible outcome would reflect the difficulties of reestablishing sovereignty for a state passed between colonial rulers for years before finally becoming independent and still being far from stability. Any action sent by the United Nations, for example UNAMIR, had “peace-keeping” capability, not “peace enforcing” capability. Peace keeping implies a pacifistic approach to non-violent peace keeping. In such a situation as Rwanda, where noted systematic killings were taking place, this was not sufficient. Thus in the effort to preserve sovereignty, full capabilities of preventing loss of life were not utilized.

4. Sometimes it is better to let a conflict run its course. In the case of genocide in Rwanda, “allowing a conflict to run its course” may have meant a number of outcomes. For example, it could have been a weeklong conflict in which Tutsi citizens were killed or moved to Internally Displaced Person camps (IDP camps), or the RPF may have come back in from Uganda and been strong enough to take over Kigali after little bloodshed. Following the arguments of Edward Luttwak, not allowing the conflict to run its course does not allow for the underlying conditions necessary for rebuilding a stable regime to surface. War has the potential to resolve political conflicts, also leading to peace. Whether both parties become exhausted or one decisive winner succeeds, the key to this theory succeeding is the necessary fighting until a resolution is reached. This argument accepts that violations of international law and human rights will happen in the course of conflict, and accepts
that it is acceptable and unavoidable for war to lead to peace (Luttwak 1999). The fighting in Rwanda was basically allowed to continue uninterrupted by the international community, and eventually the Tutsi rebel army, the RPF took Kigali and “won.” There was massive loss of life in a short period of time, but Rwanda has drastically improved multiple aspects of their state in the twenty years since the genocide (Ruxin 2010). Where there were once few paved roads and a dying tourist sector, today the $500 tickets for tourist trips to see the mountain gorillas sell out in weeks and roadway infrastructure has improved dramatically (Ruxin 2010). Supporting this argument, Rwanda essentially carried out the necessary fighting itself in order to address underlying causes of the tension and aggression.

5. Once forcible humanitarian intervention has begun, where does it end? This argument suggests that there is no clear defining limit for “forcible humanitarian intervention.” If the outside party leaves directly after conflict is resolved without addressing underlying causes, there is little chance of successfully preventing conflict in future. If the outside party lingers in the country of conflict, issues of sovereignty and dependency are raised, and putting costly maintenance responsibilities on the intervening state. France left Rwanda August 21st 1994 due to the expiration of the mandate for Operation Turquoise, but the mandates for UNOMUR, UNAMIR, and Operation Turquoise had all been extended several times, showing just how undefined a time frame for intervention can be.

6. Forcible humanitarian intervention does more harm than good. In this case study, forcible humanitarian intervention not only failed to halt the mass killings, but also through Operation Turquoise, trained and supplied arms to the genocidaires
responsible for the killings. In this case forcible humanitarian intervention did more harm than good. The intention to save lives and bring about a stable transition to a democratic government was never carried out, the UNAMIR personnel far too ill equipped legally and physically to protect victims and the French more interested in preserving French and francophone status in the world than saving lives.

CONCLUSION:

There is an overwhelming global reaction that the international community let Rwanda down, and some Rwanda citizens themselves have said that the only time they saw white people was when they were leaving (Hatzfeld 2003). President Mitterrand himself has been quoted saying, “Notre responsabilité est nulle” or “Our responsibility is worthless” upon reviewing French foreign policy documents concerning the “Rwandan affair” referring to the obligation by the international community as a whole, not just France, in the inaction that led to the death of hundreds of people (Lanotte 2007). President Paul Kagame, current president of Rwanda who neither learned French nor encourages it in Rwanda today, has been quoted following Operation Turquoise saying, “it’s criminal and the audacity rests without excuse. Their threats and efforts to intimidate us have had no effect.” Former Hutu rebel soldiers were quoted also in Lanotte’s article accusing the French of hiding other killers and helping them out of the country.

The forcible humanitarian action that took place in Rwanda has since met each of the six arguments against it leading to the conclusion that forcible humanitarian intervention in this case study was not appropriate and did not succeed. France’s close relationship with francophone Africa supports the argument that intervention was not for purely humanitarian purposes. The militaristic and political support provided by France for years before the genocide as well as
supplying arms and training during the genocide create a dependency, or pseudo-colonial relationship between the two states. The breach of sovereignty by France unilaterally acting degraded the ability of Rwanda to govern itself until finally the RPF took control and was able to start stabilization—a process still ongoing twenty years in the making. Rwanda was not permitted to run the course of its conflict without interruption, leaving the underlying causes of the genocide unaddressed and rebuilding a stable government difficult at every juncture. There was no clear end for the necessity of intervention, to the point that if *Operation Turquoise* had left sooner or if the RPF had not gained control of Kigali the conflict would still have been ongoing indefinitely. The French troops in Rwanda have, by Franco Rwandan Governmental Accords, trained and supplied with arms the *genocidaires* and permitted the escape of *genocidaires* through the “safe zone” established in *Operation Turquoise* creating more harm than good.

The international relations theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism are all presented in the case of forcible humanitarian intervention in Rwanda. These theories demonstrate why certain states or international bodies acted in the ways that they did. Demonstrating realism, the observer missions created by UNOMUR and the assistance missions created by UNAMIR attempt to work around the realist fact that no one nation was invested in Rwanda enough to send their own troops until France in July. The composition of peacekeepers and experts from the various Member States sitting on the Security Council attempted to create a neutrality to avoid national interests in a realistic manner that it was an international responsibility to intervene together. The more influential veto powers of the United Nations Security Council were unwilling to send their own troops into genocide where they had no national interest and no national gain. Some states such as China and Russia felt that intervention
should come from within Africa, but were also unwilling to potentially lose their citizens in a
conflict that did not involve their states. Demonstrating liberalism, the French pretext for
intervention was on a humanitarian basis. French foreign policy did pursue humanitarian efforts
and through Operation Turquoise the safe zone created in southwest Rwanda for the protection
of those being hunted down. More applicable than realism and liberalism in this case study is
constructivism, involving political identities, cultures, traditions and values dictating why the
French moved forward with Operation Turquoise and met such undesirable results. The French
policy of Fashoda Syndrome, or Françafrique, has established a close relationship with
francophone Africa, dating back to the Gaullist policies of cooperation during decolonization
under General Charles de Gaulle. This has been seen as a way to perpetuate Frances' role in the
global arena as an influential power and restore a sense of former grandeur since lost (Macridis,
R. C. & Aspaturian, V. V.).

Upon evaluating the arguments against forcible humanitarian intervention, they hold true
in this instance of genocide: forcible humanitarian intervention did not work. This does not mean
that forcible humanitarian intervention should never be used as an option, rather that it did not
work in this case study and must be reevaluated if it is to work in future. It is not unthinkable that
a genocide case such as this could happen again, and in our lifetime. We have already witnessed
acts of genocide in Darfur and Kosovo, and serious crimes against humanity in Libya involving
chemical weapons used on civilians. Though those instances differ from Rwanda in several
ways, the concept of forcible humanitarian intervention remains the same. From what we saw in
Rwanda, the world let Rwanda down and if we are to avoid such an instance in future we must
fundamentally change the use of forcible humanitarian intervention.
This thesis contributes to our knowledge as a community about response to genocide and encourages thought about whether forcible humanitarian intervention is appropriate or not. Once we understand why we respond and act the way that we do, we may be able to alter our responses. If we truly do want a safer, more cooperative world, we must be more proactive when we can in responding to these tragedies and absolutely more confident in our reactive measures in the name of peace. By analyzing this infamous question “what do we do?” in the face of genocide, we can better create the world we want to live in, safely and sustainably.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Human Rights Abuse</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990 October</td>
<td>Ugandan Border</td>
<td>RPF invades Rwanda</td>
<td>Government of Rwanda stages a mock RPF attack on Kigali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Kigali (majority)</td>
<td>Arbitrary arrests and detention of citizens; 75% were Tutsi. By April government acknowledge arrest of over 8,000 people</td>
<td>Most released without charge by April 1991, but abused while in prison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Kibilira commune, prefecture of Gisenyi</td>
<td>Local officials incited Hutu attack on Tutsi, over 300 killed, thousands fled their homes and over 500 houses burned</td>
<td>Occurred right after the invasion, government dismissed and jailed the local officials but they were soon released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 January-February</td>
<td>Bugogwe and NW of Rwanda</td>
<td>Massacre of over 300, possibly 1,000 civilians of Tutsi subgroup known as Bugogwe people, done by police, military, civilian officials and civilians</td>
<td>Followed major RPF offensive in area, when RPF gained town of Rubengeri (one night) and released all prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Murambi</td>
<td>Around 500 primarily Tutsi civilians forced to flee, one woman killed, girls raped and many beaten and injured</td>
<td>Followed series of savage attacks with local officials participating, victims insulted for being Tutsi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 August</td>
<td>Kibuye Ara</td>
<td>“Ethnic” massacres, 85 dead and 200 wounded, 500 houses burned and over 5,000 people displaced</td>
<td>Four days after agreement on pluralistic transitional government between RPF and government, arrested killers mostly MRND(D) or affiliates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Bugesera</td>
<td>Hundred of Tutsis massacred</td>
<td>Followed incitements from an official radio broadcast made by Ferdinand Nahimana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of year</td>
<td>NW communes</td>
<td>Local government officials, on orders from army, organized attacks on Tutsis called “clear the bush”; thousands forced to flee homes</td>
<td>Government identified Tutsi as RPF accomplices providing “cover” for invaders, used this excuse to kill approx. 2,000 Tutsi from 1990-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 January</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Commission on Human Rights allege serious and widespread abuses</td>
<td>Visited with ten experts, report published in March 1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Security Council Resolution</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Implication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 812                           | 03/12/1993 | • Need for a negotiated peace solution  
                                 |                                         | • Gravely concerned with fighting in Rwanda  
                                 |                                         | • Calls for respect of the ceasefire |
| 846                           | 06/22/1993 | • Need to prevent fighting  
                                 |                                         | • Request by Rwandan government and RPF for an international neutral force  
                                 |                                         | • Urges the respect of international law  
                                 |                                         | • Establishes UNOMUR (United Nations Observer Mission for Uganda and Rwanda)** |
| 872                           | 10/05/1993 | • Welcomes Arusha Peace Agreement and urges parties to comply  
                                 |                                         | • Stressing the urgency of the deployment of an international neutral force in Rwanda  
                                 |                                         | • Establishes United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)**  
                                 |                                         | • Monitors security leading up to elections |
| 891                           | 12/20/1993 | • Welcomes the results of UNAMOR  
                                 |                                         | • UNOMUR: successful for stability and confidence building mechanism  
                                 |                                         | • Extends UNOMUR 6 months |
| 893                           | 01/06/1994 | • Valuable contribution made by UNAMIR  
                                 |                                         | • Noting incidents of violence  
                                 |                                         | • Strongly urges all parties involved to fully comply with the Arusha Peace Agreement |
| 909                           | 04/05/1994 | • Deep concern in the delayed establishment of the broad-based transitional government  
                                 |                                         | • Noting deterioration of humanitarian and health situation  
                                 |                                         | • Extends the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994 |
| 912                           | 04/21/1994 | • Expresses deep regret for failure to implement Arusha Peace Agreement  
                                 |                                         | • Shocked at the tragic incident that resulted in the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi 6 April 1994  
                                 |                                         | • Appalled at large-scale violence which has resulted in the death of thousands of innocent civilians  
                                 |                                         | • Condemns the attacks against UNAMIR and other United Nations personnel leading to the deaths of and injury to several UNAMIR personnel  
                                 |                                         | • Modifies UNAMIR: act as intermediary between parties; assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations |
| 918                           | 05/17/1994 | • Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda...numerous killings of civilians which have taken place  
<pre><code>                             |                                         | • Stressing importance of the Arusha Peace Agreement |
</code></pre>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Key Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 925        | 06/08/1994 | - Recalling in this context that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under international law**
- Recognizing that the people of Rwanda bear ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation/reconstruction
- Authorizes the expansion and extension of UNAMIR |
| 928        | 06/20/1994 | - Noting with concern the parties have not ceased hostilities or cease-fire
- Reports that indicate acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda, which is a crime under international law**
- Noting the systematic killing of thousands of citizens
- Noting that UNAMIR does not serve the purpose of a buffer zone between the two parties
- Extends the mandate of UNAMIR, who may be required to act in self-defense in future |
| 929        | 06/22/1992 | - Noting the offer by Member States to cooperate with the Secretary-General towards the fulfillment of the objectives of the United Nations in Rwanda and stressing the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an interposition force between parties**
- Determining that the magnitude of the humanitarian crisis constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region
- Acting under Article VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the Member States cooperating with the Secretary-General to conduct the operation... using all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives** |
| 935        | 07/01/1994 | - Condemning all breaches of international humanitarian law in Rwanda
- Noted massacres and killings have continued in a systematic manner throughout Rwanda
- Evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of possible acts of genocide |
| 955        | 11/08/1994 | - This situation continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security
- Grave concerns for indications of genocide
- Establishment of International Tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide**
- Annex: Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda
- Articles I - XXXII |
| 965        | 11/30/1994 | - Recalling its resolution 955 of 8 November establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda
- Welcoming the establishment by the Secretary-General of a Trust Fund pursuant to resolution 925
- Expands UNAMIR’s mandate |
References


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