The Relationship Between President Obama's Foreign Policy Decision Making Process, Public Opinion, and International Pressure: Guantanamo Bay, Intervention in Libya, and the Drone Program

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The Relationship Between President Obama’s Foreign Policy Decision Making Process, Public Opinion, and International Pressure: Guantanamo Bay, Intervention in Libya, and the Drone Program

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Senior Honors Project

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the graduation requirements of the International Relations program

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Dr. David Richards, Committee Chair

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Abstract:

This study utilizes Robert Putnam’s “Two Level Game Theory” to understand whether public opinion influenced President Obama’s first-term administration when confronted with foreign policy decisions. Some scholars argue that there is an overall lack in understanding of how public opinion affects American foreign policy because the public is disengaged and uneducated on foreign issues and that the role of media influences the public’s attitude towards a certain issue. Accordingly, it is hypothesized here that public opinion was not a factor in this process. To test this proposition, the study evaluates three cases: the “closing” of Guantanamo Bay, the United States’ intervention in Libya, and the continuation of the drone program. Throughout each case, multiple variables are examined including: public opinion of the citizens and the political elite, President Obama’s political communication, and international diplomatic actions. Findings indicate that public opinion did not play any major role in President Obama’s foreign policy decision-making process; therefore, President Obama’s policies did not meet Robert Putnam’s criteria of domestic influence in the two level game theory.

When looking at the results of the three cases that were examined in the study, it is safe to say that the results were inconclusive because only two of the three cases met the expectations of the hypothesis. The cases of Guantanamo Bay and the intervention in Libya supported the hypothesis because even though public opinion was strongly against closing the prison and getting involved in the war in Libya, the Obama Administration continuously pursued its support for these policies regardless of the public’s opinion and desires. With the drone program, there was strong support from the public for using and continuing the drone program in fighting terrorism. Therefore, the drone program is the only case where the support from the domestic level aligned with the support from the international level, as predicted by Robert Putnam’s two level game theory.
There is a worldwide perception that the United States plays the role of the “anchor of global security” which makes the U.S. government feel compelled to remain dominant in international policy. However, it is not always necessarily clear as to what influences the United States’ foreign policy. There is this belief that the United States government is responsible for making its decision based off of both public opinion and diplomatic beliefs and opinions but can the government do both? This study argues that public opinion is not as important when it comes to President Obama’s foreign policy decision-making process and that the government seems to make their decisions because they feel that they feel pressured to get involved due to international pressure from other countries or international organizations.

There have been many different theories that have evolved since the introduction of research on public opinion and how it influences not only domestic policy but also, foreign policy. There has also been much speculation of if public opinion even has an influence on the political elites who are in charge of policy making. Henry Durant and Kenneth Younger in the mid 1900s were two pioneers who pushed for there to be more research to fill the gaps in determining public opinion’s influence on domestic and foreign policies.

Henry Durant was one of the foundational theorists to look at the link between both public opinion and policy making. In Durant’s article “Public Opinion, Polls and Foreign Policy” (1955), he argued that public opinion must be looked at in order to determine why there was such a gap between foreign and domestic policies. Durant also noticed that the “general will” or the public opinion was only believed to apply to domestic issues and not foreign issues. There is one argument that he makes in this article that can still be seen today and that is the lack of knowledge the public has on foreign issues. In his article he mentions that one third of the population polled knew nothing of the issue they were voting on, one third of the polled
population was aware of the issue but could not be considered informed on the issue, and one third of the polled population consistently showed knowledge on the issues at hand (1955). Overall, even though Durant’s article was a relevant issue in the mid 1950s it is an argument that is outdated today. However, his article and argument can still be used as the foundation for the growing research on public opinion and policymaking issues.

Kenneth Younger had similar ideas to Henry Durant, both of who were writing in the mid 1950s. In Younger’s article “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy” (1955), he argues that foreign policy in Britain had remained somewhat oligarchic unlike domestic policies, meaning that foreign policy remained more distant from ordinary people while domestic policy remained more immediate to the people. Younger gives a personal anecdote saying that he was a minister in the Foreign Office and when he had switched from the Home Office in Britain to the Foreign Office he was surprised to see how little their decisions were influenced by the public however, he believes that the government subconsciously tends to lean toward the general will of the people (1955). Much like Durant, Younger’s argument may have been relevant at the time his article was published but this article is one that is also outdated. It can be seen today in Britain, British citizens have more opportunities to be involved in foreign policy decisions and the peoples’ opinions are heard when it comes to these foreign policy decisions, for example, “Brexit”. Great Britain held a referendum where their citizens got to decide whether or not to leave the European Union and when the vote came back “yes” the government and the European Union began working on ways to leave the international organization, listening to the people’s opinion. However, even if this article is outdated, it can also be used as a foundation for the growing research in this field.
The influence of public opinion on policy making can be broken down into two separate fields: influences of public opinion on domestic policy and then on foreign policy. First, it might be beneficial to look at the theories some scholars have used to determine how or even if public opinion has any weight in domestic policymaking. In Fay L. Cook, Jason Barabas, and Benjamin I. Page's paper, titled “Invoking Public Opinion: Policy Elites and Social Security” (2002), they attempt to argue that policy elites do refer to public opinion; elites often refer to opinion specifically in a manner that hints at the balance of opinion on certain issues; and that policy elites' references to public opinion are normally backed by and not inconsistent with survey evidence and results. However, in the end the authors experienced mixed results. Throughout the article they use democratic theory and median voter theorem as their theories in order to support their research on the topic of how public opinion has influenced public policy, specifically social security between the years 1993 and 1999 (2002). Democratic Theory is the notion that the idea of the population's participation has a minimal role in politics and that it is dangerous for the wide popular population to participate in politics (Pateman 1970). While the Median Voter Theorem is that each individual in a group attempts to maximize their own power- each individual wants to benefit the most and sometimes this behavior results in the median voter being able to cast the decisive vote in a contest (Poulette).

In Paul Burstein's article “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda” (2003), he argues that there is a big gap in the knowledge of how public opinion influences public policy and that such gaps will need to be addressed in future research. Burstein's results show that his hypothesis is correct; first he finds that public opinion does affect policy but only three quarters of the time that the impact is measured. Second, salience does affect the impact of public opinion on policy. Third, the impact of public opinion on policy is
substantial when interest organizations, political parties, and elites are taken into account; however, the scarcity of data on interest organizations and elites needs caution when interpreting the results of such data. Fourth, government responsiveness to the public cannot be rejected because there is little evidence, however the evidence does not support his hypothesis. Fifth, the ability to generalize about the impact of opinion on policy is bargained by the slim focus of available work (2003). This argument of Burstein’s can be used to show the problems with using public opinion as a theory and also as an error in my research and results.

While Burstein showed that there are pieces of the puzzle missing when it comes to the impact of public opinion on policymaking there are also scholars who believe that domestic policies are not influenced by public opinion. Scholars François Petry and Matthew Mendelsohn in their article “Public Opinion and Policy Making in Canada: 1994-2001” (2004) argue that there is an obvious dilemma of the supposed attention that public opinion and the lack of correlation between policy and public opinion during Jean Chrétien’s administration, which they believe is caused by ideological differences between the public and the government. Their results show that there was a lack of change in policy during the more liberal government of President Chrétien because the former president Mulroney was conservative and the public opinion tended to lean more conservative, therefore making the Chrétien government less responsive to opinion (2004).

Just like with domestic policy and public opinion, there are numerous articles that support or deny the idea that the public is influential in foreign policy decision making; so here are a couple of articles that support the argument that public opinion influences foreign policy. In Douglas Foyle’s article “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Belief’s as a Mediating Variable” (1997), he argues that public opinion’s influence on foreign policy varies due to
numerous factors including decision time and type of issue under consideration. In his article, he examines decision maker beliefs about public opinion in the two following areas: (1) normative beliefs and (2) practical beliefs. His results show that beliefs can be a variable of influence in public opinion on foreign policy decision making; it also showed that this extends to the presidential level and as with lower level officials, beliefs defined the conditions under which decision makers felt that the opinion of the public was relevant to policy making (1997).

Scholars T. Knecht and M.S. Weatherford argued in their article “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making” (2006), that Presidents and their policy making teams do not have a blank card but unless there is high demand from the public on an issue then the administration has looser constraints on their foreign policy decisions; however, the salience of foreign policy issues to the public is important because officials that are elected are more likely to give closer consideration to the potential impact it will have on their chances of election if the public is more attentive to foreign policy issues. In their results, they show that the immediacy of international issues and the action taken by the President in their decision process influences public attentiveness; and that international crises receive more attention by the public and here the presidents have the potential to help give the public knowledge of the national interest (2006). They show that presidents and elected officials are more likely to pay attention and listen to public opinion because their election or re-election depends on the public.

Mark Weisbrot mentions in his article, “Commentary: Obama’s Latin America Policy: Continuity Without Change” (2011), that President Barack Obama may be listening public opinion when it comes down to more well covered topics for example with the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, when it comes to Latin America, the region is typically not the main focus of the public and does not get as much attention. Weisbrot also says that President Obama
and his administration tend to focus more on what the media thinks about their decision-making. (2011).

The following articles do not show that public opinion has a substantial influence on foreign policy, in J.A. Murray and Lawrence Leduc’s article “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Options in Canada” (1976-1977), they want to explore if the climate of opinion in Canada on the idea of economic nationalism and some specific aspects of the third option in Canadian foreign policy. The third option in Canada is know as the idea of being less dependent economically on the United States and leaning closer to European and Asian countries (1976-1977). In their results, they found that there is an increasing mood of economic nationalism in Canada today but this increasing desire has not been overwhelming enough to cause changes in the country’s foreign policy (1976-1977). They show that regardless of increasing desire from the public, the government has done nothing to take their opinions into consideration more than likely because partnering and remaining close economically to the United States is in Canada’s best interest.

In Philip J. Powlick and Andrew Z. Katz’s article “Defining the American Public Opinion/ Foreign Policy Nexus” (1998), they argued that there is an overall lack in understanding of how public opinion affects American foreign policy making. They argue that the public is disengaged and uneducated on foreign issues and that the role of media influences the public’s attitude towards a certain issue. In their conclusion, their overall main point is that there needs to be more research and studies done on the topic (1998). They believe that not enough research has been done on the connection between public opinion and its influence on foreign policy making and that it will need to be something that is addressed in future research.

In the article “Dangerous Complacencies: Obama, Latin America, and the Misconceptions of Power” (2011), the author mentions that President Obama did not really listen
to anyone outside of his administration and that the foreign policy towards Latin America at this time was mainly in the interest of big business. Meaning that foreign policy decisions were made in Latin America based off of corporate capital like natural resources, cheap labor and etc. and there is no mention of what public opinion had to say about policy in Latin America. (2011).

In an article written by Michael C. Desch, “The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: The Liberal Tradition and Obama’s Counterterrorism Policy” (2010) he uses Jack Goldsmith’s ideas to say that there is a continuity in counterterrorism policies between Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama. To explain one of the reasons for this continuity he uses the bureaucratic politics theory, which is the idea that where you sit as a president will also determine where you stand in your increasing presidential authority. Another aspect that shows that President Obama focus on the administrations’ beliefs rather than public opinion is that in the article Desch states that there was a broad agreement among the country’s political elite that there was widespread, inevitable fear post September 11 that requires new measures in order to survive. (2010).

When it comes to studying President Obama’s foreign policy and how it is influenced by public opinion, it is necessary to look at what questions researchers tend to ask the public. In Richard C. Eichenberg’s article “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Obama Era” (2009), he writes that President Obama came into presidential office with higher than normal approval ratings from the public and while overtime they may have decreased, the public remains to have high confidence in President Obama’s decision making. Throughout the article he gives tables that show the outcomes of polls and the public is broken down into three categories: democrats, republicans, and independents. There are two tables in the article relevant to Obama’s foreign policy and they ask the public about various policies and concerns: to rank which tasks should be
the top priority for the American leader, relations with Europe and National security issues. (2009).

However, when it comes to public opinion on President Obama’s foreign policy making there are some instances where President Obama does not seem to follow what the public wants. Eichenberg gives an example about the War in Iraq and Afghanistan where a majority of the public wanted a decrease in the amount of United States troops stationed in these countries but President Obama instead increased the number of troops there not only once but twice and both times there was majority support from the public once President Obama made the decision. This example shows Eichenberg’s idea that even though the public may not always agree with the dilemma; they tended to have high confidence in President Obama’s decision-making skills. (2009).

In Robert D. Putnam’s article “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games” (1988), he focuses his paper on creating a conceptual framework for understanding how diplomacy and domestic politics interact with one another. Putnam settles on the two-level game theory meaning that politics of many international negotiations can be seen as a two-level game. He states that at the national level, domestic groups will pursue their interests by putting pressure on the government to support more favorable policies to the public and the politicians will look for power by creating coalitions amongst these groups; while at the international level, governments look to increase and maximize their ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while they decrease or minimize the consequences of foreign developments. Putnam also states “any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game boars, and conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat” (1988).
For my research, I will use Robert D. Putnam’s Two-Level Game theory and argue that public opinion has not had an influence in President Obama’s foreign policy decision-making process, therefore making his theory incorrect in certain cases. Putnam expects that the domestic level of the two level game will ratify and support the decisions made at the international level, therefore benefiting both levels of the game since both the domestic and the international levels would be receiving what they bargained for. The domestic level of the game is responsible for ratifying what the international level decides on and negotiates and Putnam argues that it will happen because the president’s administration is committed to both the domestic and international sectors (1988). However, this is not always the case.

Hypothesis and Variables:

This study will answer the following question: what influenced President Barack Obama’s foreign policy decision-making process throughout his first term? This study will evaluate three different foreign policies: the “closing” of Guantanamo Bay, intervention in Libya, and the expansion of the drone program. When President Obama was making these decisions, it is evident that he did not follow public opinion and therefore this tends to leave what influenced his decision-making process lean towards international pressure. Therefore, it is hypothesized that public opinion was not a major factor in President Obama’s process.

Throughout each case, multiple variables are examined including: public opinion of both the citizens and the political elite, President Obama’s political communication, and international diplomatic actions. It is imperative to look at what the Obama administration said their intentions were for making these foreign policy decisions because readers need background as to what the administration told the public what these policies focused on and how they would be beneficial to
the public. Therefore, statements made by the administration about the policies could have had an impact on the public’s opinions on the policies, which are reflected in the public opinion polls. However, when looking at international pressure it is important to take into consideration why international actors chose to support the United States in their operations and who was pressuring to who to get or not get involved in these cases.

The most important variable to my research is the statistics that were gathered from the public opinion polls. These numbers will show either support or opposition to the arguments made by President Obama and his administration. If the numbers prove to be consistent with the arguments and the policies put in place by the administration then the proposed hypothesis will be deemed incorrect. However, if the numbers are inconsistent with the arguments and policies put in place by the administration then the hypothesis will be correct. Then, there will be an analysis of the international actors that were involved and supported the United States’ ambitions. Were these countries feeling pressured to join in on the side of the United States or was the United States feeling pressured to join other countries in their actions?

Cases:

“Closing” of Guantanamo Bay

The United States began the construction of Guantanamo Bay in 1903 when Cuba agreed to lease approximately 45 square miles of land in Guantánamo Bay in order for the United States to construct a naval station. Originally the prison was used as a migrant detention facility but after the September 11, 2001 attacks and military operations in Afghanistan, this facility was repurposed to hold suspected terrorist detainees. President George W. Bush’s administration said that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay were not on US soil and in turn were not covered by the
US Constitution and because they were seen as “enemy combatants” meant that some legal protections could be denied to the detainees. (CNN Library 2016a).

During the 2008 Presidential campaigns, then-presidential candidate Barack Obama made a campaign promise to close the prison at Guantanamo Bay within one year of him taking office (Sekulow 2016). Soon after President Obama was inaugurated in 2009, he signed an executive order to close down the facility (CNN Library 2016a) however; it is now eight years later and GITMO is still open and holding detainees. It is still open today because President Obama has faced major opposition in Congress about the transportation of detainees and the overall closing of the facility because Congress believes that this would harm the U.S.’ national security rather than doing it any good.

President Obama has claimed time and time again that the Guantanamo Bay prison should be closed because it undermines the national security and interest of justice of the United States (Obama 2009) and that it is counterproductive in the U.S.’ fight against terrorists. Along with this idea, the claim has also been made that Guantanamo Bay has been used as propaganda by terrorists seeking new recruits. President Obama says that not only has it undermine US national security but it has also undermined the United States’ foreign policy and the US’ partnerships with allies and other countries that the US needs in order to fight terrorism. Keeping Guantanamo open also drained military resources, with approximately $450 million spent in 2015 to keep the facility open and more than $200 million in additional costs to keep it running in the future (Garunay 2016) and also it has been very costly the United States taxpayers. (Obama 2009).

Jullette Kayyem, a CNN National Security Analyst, agreed with President Obama’s reasoning. Kayyem stated that while Guantanamo Bay may have made sense during 2002, now
Guantanamo’s purpose has run its course. Kayyem claimed that while the idea of closing the Guantanamo prison has transformed from a decision that seemed impossible to one that has become more manageable because as of now, eight years later, there are less than one hundred detainees left to be transported from the prison. She also stated that Obama’s consistent pressure for the closure of the prison has turned Guantanamo from propaganda for terrorism into something that is far less powerful. (2016).

However, while President Obama has continuously said that his decision to close Guantanamo Bay is what is best for the nation’s national security and so on, others do not believe that that is the case. Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton stated that President Obama is continuing with his campaign to close the prison at Guantanamo to protect his political legacy, which Senator Cotton believes to be a grave mistake that would harm the U.S.’ national security because the prison’s closure could be used as propaganda for radical Islamists. Senator Cotton also says that he had the opportunity to visit Guantanamo Bay in 2015. According to his experiences, the prison is nothing as barbaric as President Obama makes it seem to the public. The International Red Cross can and has visited the facilities multiple times and so have other international human-rights groups. Detainees have also received equivalent medical care as the guards and have been able to participate in their daily prayer sessions. (2016).

Senator Cotton claimed that Guantanamo Bay has allowed the United States government to extract important intelligence from detainees that have helped stop plots against Americans. For example, he mentioned that information was obtained from detainees at the prison which was lead information used in the mission to find and kill Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Sen. Cotton made the claim that by closing the prison this is the kind of information that the government would miss out on. He took into consideration what has happened to detainees once they have
been released from the facilities. He gave the readers an example of the release of Mullah Abdul Rauf in 2007, who was a former commander for the Taliban. After his release from the prison, he became a “warlord” in southern Afghanistan and pledged his allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and led groups of insurgent fighters. In 2016 United States forces encountered Rauf once again but this time he was killed. Well over 650 detainees have been released from the prison and out of that number 196 former detainees have been confirmed or suspected of returning to the battlefield. (2016).

The last example that Senator Cotton gave was of a detainee who was released from Guantanamo Bay in early January 2016, Mahmud Umar Muhammad Bin Atef. Upon his release from the prison Atef made statements that referenced to how all Americans should die because that is part of Allah’s rules. Atef threatened to look up the names and faces of the guards from Guantanamo and sneak into their homes and “cut their throats like sheep” (2016). Sen. Cotton used these examples to show how the closure of Guantanamo Bay would be harmful to the United States’ national security and contradictory to the idea that the government is supposed to provide protection to its citizens. (2016).

Jay Sekulow of Fox News believed quite the opposite. Sekulow writes that President Obama has his own “politically motivated desires” (2016) ahead of the United States’ national security and Sekulow said that his decision to close the prison is nothing but President Obama and his legacy, nothing else. Sekulow believed that nothing was more important to President Obama than keeping this campaign promise and maintaining his legacy. (2016).

Joe Nocera from the New York Times wrote about how President Obama gave the public the impression that some things are worth fighting for but Nocera made the argument that the president gives the impression that that’s what President Obama has believed while he has really
done nothing to act on that belief. Nocera said that Obama has blamed the failure to close Guantanamo prison on the laws that Congress passed on transferring detainees. However, he stated that the president could have jumped through hoops to go around these laws but the president never tried. Instead, President Obama froze all transfers of inmates who were eligible and had been cleared for transfer to other countries. Nocera explained that the government said that there was no national security interest in holding these men. Yet Obama continued to let them rot in that Cuban hell.” (2013).

When President Obama made the decision to sign an executive order to begin the process of closing the Guantanamo Bay prison, did he use public opinion to guide his decision making process? Numerous public opinion polls show that the American public was opposed to closing the Guantanamo Bay prison and moving some of the detainees to United States prisons, therefore showing us that the president did not take public opinion much into consideration. In the following poll released by Gallup shows readers that over half of the American public does not favor the closing of Guantanamo Bay and transferring the detainees to the United States while only thirty percent of the American public does agree with this decision (Newport 2009).
As you may know, since 2001, the United States has held people from other countries who are suspected of being terrorists in a prison at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Do you think the United States should -- or should not -- close this prison and move some of the prisoners to U.S. prisons?

GALLUP

Figure 1: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup on the decision to close Guantanamo Bay and move the detainees to United States prisons.

A second graph from Gallup shows the numbers broken down into the publics' political party identifications, which shows that Democrats tend support President Obama’s push for the closure of the prison, more than any other party, with over half of the Democrats supporting the closure in May 2009 and then a slight drop to fifty percent in November 2009. (Newport 2009).
Another poll conducted by Pew Research Center shows the same results, in November 2009, more people wanted to keep Guantanamo Bay open, forty-nine percent of people disapproved closing Guantanamo while thirty-nine percent pushed for the closure of the prison. However, in 2012 this situation would reverse. Seventy percent of people wanted to keep Guantanamo Bay open while only twenty-four percent still pushed for the closure of the prison. (Tyson 2013).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Views of Guantanamo: 2012 and 2009</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>February, 2012</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to keep Guantanamo OPEN*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<th>November, 2009</th>
<th>Decision to CLOSE Guantanamo</th>
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<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>49</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>12</td>
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Figure 3: Public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center that shows the comparison of results from 2009 and 2012 on the people polled's support or disapproval of keeping Guantanamo Bay open.

International Pressure

When it comes to looking at international pressure on the United States' decision to "close" Guantanamo Bay, it is important to take Cuba into consideration. Considering the United
States of America and Cuba entered a legally binding agreement in 1903 where the United States gained control over the Guantanamo Bay area, situated on the Cuban island. However, in recent years as the United States and Cuba have been attempting to re-establish the relationship between the two countries there have been mixed feelings about the U.S.’ presence at Guantanamo Bay. The Cuban government has asked, rather demanded, that the United States’ government gives the Guantanamo Bay military base back to Cuba before there can be any restoration of relations between the countries (BBC 2015).

Raul Castro has stated that Cuba will begin to commence the restoration of the their relationship with the United States, under two conditions: the United States giving Guantanamo Bay back to Cuba and the end of the United States’ trade embargos placed on Cuba (BBC 2015). Castro claims that the Guantanamo Bay naval base was illegally occupied by the United States (BBC 2015) and the people of Cuba also believe that the land was stolen from the Cubans (Navarro 2005). However, the land cannot be given back to Cuba unless there is a mutual agreement between Cuba and the U.S. (Navarro 2005) and yet the Obama administration was not ready to change the lease that would give the naval base back to Cuba (Lamothe and Gibbons-Neff 2016). While the Obama administration has been aiming to close down the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, the administration does not want to give up the whole naval base because they believe that the naval base has a larger mission that goes beyond the detention facility (Lamothe and Gibbons-Neff 2016). However, the Obama administration is working to improve relations with Cuba through increasing trade via the abolition of the U.S.’ trade embargos on Cuba and also by removing the travel ban that was previously in place, allowing United States citizen to travel to Cuba.
Apart from Cuba there have been numerous nations and international actors that have advocated for the closure of Guantanamo Bay including: Chancellor Angela Merkel, Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón, Church of England Synod, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ireland Dermot Ahrem, South African Archbishop Desmon Tutu, Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz, and the Icelandic Parliament (CSHRA 2005). There has also been steep pressure from the European Union, the United Nations, and Amnesty International.

The European Union has pushed for the closure of the Guantanamo Bay facility and the institution has also come up with a plan and ideas to aid the United States in the closing procedures. In 2006, the European Parliament drafted and finalized a resolution on Guantanamo Bay. Within the resolution it says that, like most other international actors, that the European Parliament was and still is against the use of Guantanamo Bay because there, the United States was violating human rights (EPRG 2006). The European Parliament argued that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay deserved the right to a fair trial, this came after the fact that the United States government signed a statement stating that the detainees being held at Guantanamo bay have no right to a fair trial in the United States’ civil courts (EPRG 2006). The European Parliament also believed that the United States Army Regulation 190-55 was unlawful because this allowed prisoners who were given the death penalty by courts-martial to be executed at not only Guantanamo Bay but also all detention centers (EPRG 2006).

At the end of the European Parliament’s resolution, the European Parliament calls out the United States and wants the U.S. government to take action and close Guantanamo Bay. The resolution states:

[European Parliament] Calls on the US Administration to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility and insists that every prisoner should be treated in accordance with
international humanitarian law and tried without delay in a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, impartial tribunal... Condemns all forms of torture and ill-treatment and reiterates the need to comply with international law... Reiterates that the fight against terrorism... can only be successfully pursued if human rights and civil liberties are fully respected. (EPRG 2006).

Since that resolution was passed, the European Union and the United States government have been meeting and working with one another to find solutions and ways to close Guantanamo Bay and in hopes of future counter-terrorism cooperation. However, in particular the European Union is worried about the U.S.’ disregard for human rights in the detention facility. In a “Factsheet” posted on the European Union Delegation to the United Nations website it says, “By working with the US in its endeavors to close Guantanamo, the EU hopes it can make a positive contribution to changing US policies... in particular, indefinite detention without trial needs to be addressed to avoid creating unlawful detention facilities elsewhere” (Accessed 2017).

However, it has not only been state actors that have been opposed to Guantanamo Bay but also international organizations such as the United Nations and Amnesty International. These two organizations have been opposed to the operation of Guantanamo Bay for the same reasons as the European Union, the belief that the facility is a violation of human rights. Navanethem Pillay, the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the United Nations spoke out about the United States inability to close the Guantanamo detention facility and the failure of being held accountable for human rights violations such as the use of torture that took place at the facility and international law violations (UN News Centre 2012). Ms. Pillay also condemned the National Defense Authorization Act, which normalized and allowed indefinite military detention without the detainee being charged or allowed a trial (UN News Centre 2012). She also called
for those employees that "perpetrated, ordered, tolerated, or condoned torture and ill-treatment" be brought to justice and that as long as the detention facility remains open, then the facility must fully comply with the human rights standards put in place under international law (UN News Centre 2012).

Amnesty International has also argued amongst the same points via numerous campaign articles posted to their website. The organization argues that the continued operation of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility is an example of the United States' double standard on human rights (Amnesty International). Amnesty International's Security and Human Rights Campaign has four main goals that are driving their agenda and activism: first, to advise the United States government to close the detention facility immediately (Amnesty International). Second, demand the United States government to release or give fair trial to all of the detainees being held in the detention facility (Amnesty International). Third, stop Congress from passing legislation that prohibits the transfer of detainees from Guantanamo Bay (Amnesty International). Fourth, demand that the United States be held accountable for treating detainees cruelly, inhumanely, and with degrading treatment (Amnesty International). The organization also wants to make sure that the Obama Administration and the United States government understands that the human rights cannot be sacrificed for national security (Amnesty International).

Amnesty International and numerous other organizations sponsored protests, in Washington D.C., against the Obama Administration failure to maintain and uphold his campaign promise of closing down the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. January 11th, 2013, eleven years after the first prisoners were brought into the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. Amnesty International and numerous organizations sponsored worldwide protests in order to
show their opposition to the prison (Amnesty International 2013). Fifty-five protestors dressed up in orange jumpsuits with black bags over their heads to represent the fifty-five detainees that have been cleared to be transferred by the United States government but had not be transferred (Amnesty International 2013). Other protestors carried signs and marched from the White House down to the Supreme Court to make their voices heard but this not only took place in D.C. but in cities around the globe to put pressure on the United States government (Amnesty International 2013).

Intervention in Libya

As a result of the Arab Spring, anti-government protests that began in February 2011 in Libya, former Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi ordered his security forces to crack down on protesters that took action in Benghazi. As the protests began to spread throughout Libya, the country was on the brink of a civil war that would soon follow. Numerous civilian deaths occurred and many political officials in the Libyan government resigned from office and demanded for the removal of “the tyrant Muammar Qaddafi”. (CNN Library 2016b).

The first move the United States took was the evacuation of Americans in Libya and closed the U.S. Embassy in Libya in late February 2011. Next, President Obama signed an executive order that froze Qaddafi’s assets. Following President Obama, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions against Libya, which included an arms embargo and freezing Libyan assets. The European Union also began to impose sanctions against Libya, which included the same stipulations as the U.N. Security Council’s sanctions. In March, NATO began 24-hour air surveillance of Libya and the U.N. Security Council and NATO establish a no-
fly zone over Libya. In April, NATO began using airstrikes to target Libyan rebels. (CNN Library 2016b).

The Libya Contact Group, which included, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan agreed to set up a fund that would provide money and support the Libyan opposition. The National Transitional Council (NTC) took over power in Libya and many countries around the world recognized the NTC as the legitimate authority in Libya including the United States. On October 20, 2011 Muammar Qaddafi was killed after rebel forces in Sirte, Libya capture him. A few days later, the NTC declared the nation’s freedom in Benghazi and the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to end their military operations in Libya, which in turn cancelled the NATO mission in Libya at the end of the month. Following the end of the missions, the NTC elected Abdurrahim El-Keib as their prime minister. (CNN Library 2016b).

Regarding the United States freezing the assets of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime, which was over thirty-three billion U.S. dollars (Obama 2011c), there were off-the-record meetings of the Council on Foreign Relations where lawyers and former political appointees from the Bush administration had discussed what to do with this money (Carter 2011). In one of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s released emails, Barry Carter explained that at the meeting these officials talked about how frozen Libyan assets should be used to help fund the United States’ military costs of it role in Libya and that some of the funds should be used to aid in the reduction of the U.S. deficit (2011). However, at the end of the email, Carter adds in his own personal statement saying that these proposed ideas would be inconsistent to what President Obama had stated, that the money did not belong to the U.S. or Qaddafi but rather to the Libyan people, and also inconsistent with the U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. He
adds in that it would also make the U.S.' allies and the Libyan people question the U.S.' intentions, and that the worst charge would be that the United States would be using Muslim money to fund a war against the Muslims. (Carter 2011).

President Obama stated that after talking to his national security team and Congress (Obama 2011a), they came to the decision that intervening in Libya was in the best interest of the United States in terms of national security and foreign policy (Obama 2011b). In a speech by President Obama at the National Defense University he stated that the United States has played the role as an anchor of global security and an advocate for human freedom and that when the U.S.' values are at stake, there is a responsibility to act (2011c). The president claimed that this was the reason for getting involved in Libya by stating that Muammar Qaddafi had ignored and taken away his peoples' freedom, exploited their wealth, had murdered opponents to his regime both at home and abroad, and had terrorized innocent people around the world- which include Americans who were killed by Libyan agents. Therefore, President Obama had explained that the United States' intervention was for humanitarian reasons by saying that the United States got involved in order to protect the citizens of Libya from the “tyrant Muammar Qaddafi” (2011c).

In the same speech, President Obama also addressed people who were opposed to the United States getting involved in Libya. The president said that those in opposition to his decision made the argument that there were numerous places in the world were innocent civilians faced brutal government violence and that America should not be expected to “police the world”(2011c) when there were so many issues that need to be worked on in the States. The president addressed this opposition by saying that Libya was foreshadowing violence on a horrific scale and that the United States had a “unique ability” (2011c) to stop that violence through an international mandate for action, a global coalition that had joined the U.S., the
support of the Arab countries, and there was a cry for help from the Libyan citizens themselves. The president also stated that there was an ability to stop Qaddafi forces without having to risk American troops lives by putting boots on the ground. (2011c).

President Obama also made two other points in favor of his decision to get involved in Libya. First, he claimed that there was a strategic interest in getting involved because if the United States had not gotten involved there would have been a continuation of massacres which, would have driven out thousands of additional refugees across Libya's borders into Egypt and Tunisia which were in the process of peaceful, yet fragile democratic transitions (2011c). This influx of refugees would have disrupted and placed major strains on the political transitions in Egypt and Tunisia that came as a result of the Arab Spring. The next argument President Obama made in his speech was that if there was not an intervention in Libya, the writ of the U.N. Security Council would have been nothing but empty words and sheets of paper, which in turn would have harmed the credibility of the U.N. to uphold global security and peace (2011c).

There are some people who do not believe that the United States' intervention in Libya was about humanitarian reasons or the protection of Libyan citizens at all but rather that it was about the U.S. wanting a regime change in Libya from the start. Micah Zenko, a writer for Foreign Policy, wrote about the hypocrisy in the Obama administration when it came to what the administration said to the public vs. what the administration actually authorized. Zenko mentioned that the Obama administration misled the American public because had the administration stated that they were after a regime change all along, there would have been even less support from the public. The first action Zenko pointed out was that the Obama administration continuously claimed that they were not out to kill or take out Muammar Qaddafi, yet just hours into the intervention on October 20, 2011, missiles launched from a British
submarine that struck one of Qaddafi’s administration buildings in his compound which was less than fifty yards from his residence. (2016).

The next point that Zenko mentioned was the hypocrisy in the arms embargo. Resolution 1970 was supposed to prohibit the transfer of arms from either side of the opponents in Libya during the war. NATO officials consistently claimed that there had been no violation of the arms embargo. However, Egypt and Qatar were shipping weapons to rebel groups the entire time and the two countries even had the blessing of the Obama administration. There is a piece of evidence that came from a video that NATO released on May 24, 2011. In the video a Canadian frigate, that was supposed to be enforcing the arms embargo, boarded a rebel boat and found small arms and explosives which were both prohibited by Resolution 1970. Libyan rebels were using the boat to move arms from Benghazi to Misratah and when the NATO officials that boarded the boat called NATO headquarters to figure out what to do, NATO decided to let the rebels continue on their path with no consequences at all. (2016).

According to public opinion polls conducted by Gallup approximately three months from one another showed that there was a decline in the American citizens’ support for U.S. military operations in Libya. (Jones 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Approve</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Disapprove</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% No opinion</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GALLUP
Figure 4: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup about United States military actions in Libya in 2011.

In a different public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center they showed that the majority of the American public did not believe that the United States had a responsibility to intervene in Libya. (Jones 2011).

| Small Partisan Differences in Views of U.S Responsibility in Libya |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| **U.S. has responsibility to do something about fighting in Libya?** | **Does** | **Does not** | **DK** |
| Total                          | 27  | 63  | 10  |
| Men                            | 30  | 63  | 7   |
| Women                          | 24  | 62  | 14  |
| 18-29                          | 31  | 55  | 14  |
| 30-49                          | 31  | 62  | 7   |
| 50-64                          | 27  | 66  | 6   |
| 65+                            | 18  | 69  | 13  |
| College grad+                  | 28  | 63  | 10  |
| Some college                   | 31  | 57  | 12  |
| HS or less                     | 25  | 67  | 9   |
| Republican                     | 27  | 65  | 8   |
| Democrat                       | 33  | 57  | 10  |
| Independent                    | 24  | 67  | 9   |
| **Following news from Libya...** |          |          |          |
| Very closely                   | 36  | 58  | 5   |
| Less closely                   | 23  | 65  | 12  |

Figure 5: Public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center about if the United States has a responsibility to act in Libya. Results are broken down by demographics of those polled.

Also conducted by the Pew Research Center a second poll showed that the majority of Americans were against using military forces in Libya because they believed that the United States' military forces were already overcommitted. (Pew Research Center 2011).
Argument Against Force: 
Military Is Overcommitted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arguments against using military force in Libya...</th>
<th>Mar 10-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. military forces already overcommitted</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition groups may be no better than current government</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya not of vital interest to U.S.</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None – Do not support force (Vol.)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other/Don’t know</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Mar. 10-13, 2011. PEW8. Figures may not add to 100% because of rounding.

Figure 6: Public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center that shows why citizens were against getting involved in Libya.

International Pressure

Internationally, the intervention in Libya was very controversial, many nations across the globe were hesitant to get involved and support countries such as France and Great Britain. The United States was one of those hesitant countries, it did not want to be heavily involved in military intervention but once a no-fly zone was established in Libya, the United States came to the aid of fellow NATO, UN Security Council and European countries. There was an increasing amount of pressure on the United States to get involved from the French and the British governments, who spearheaded the movement for military involvement against Muammar Qaddafi’s oppressive regime.

Former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s foreign minister, Alain Juppe, and former Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Cameron, placed a lot of pressure on the United Nations Security Council, which the United States is a part of, to put into place a no-fly zone over Libya and to potentially consider the use of airstrikes on Qaddafi’s regime (Cody 2011).
Former French foreign minister Juppe laid out multiple conditions for establishing a no-fly zone over Libya such as: “it would need the international legitimacy of a clear United Nations Security Council resolution; it should not be a NATO operation because of the Alliance’s image in the Arab world as an American tool; it would need at least symbolic Arab military participation; and it would require an explicit call from the Arab world” (The Economist 2011). Nicolas Sarkozy believed that if Qaddafi’s regime was harming his citizens by using chemical weapons or air strikes against them, then the use of force and outside intervention was needed in order to aid and protect the Libyan citizens (Watt 2011). Sarkozy and Cameron said that if Qaddafi’s regime were guilty of crimes against humanity then that would grant the necessary legality under the Geneva conventions to establish a no-fly zone or targeted air strikes (Watt 2011).

Numerous European countries were against the idea of establishing a no-fly zone over Libya because they believed that it would cause more collateral damage and civilian deaths rather than doing any good and that establishing and setting up a no-fly zone would have taken too long as in weeks or months (Watt 2011). At the time, the United States government, especially former US defense secretary Robert Gates, were confused as to how a no-fly zone would actually be effective as most of the slaughtering was happening on the ground and the U.S. then demanded for more (Wintour and Watt 2011). Many diplomatic leaders thought Sarkozy was crazy and irresponsible for having recognized the transitional government as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people (Watt 2011). However, David Cameron thought that the no-fly zone and increased measures on Libya were necessary in order to send a clear message to Qaddafi’s regime and tell him that their behavior is unacceptable and that he must step down from power (Watt 2011). Cameron also stated that this should have been an
opportunity for Europe and other democratic nations to be encouraging and shaping the
democratic shifts in North Africa caused by the Arab Spring (Watt 2011).

France, Great Britain, and the United States had all demanded that Qaddafi step down
from power however, France took the lead in the movement and France was also the first country
to recognize the rebel leadership, or the Libyan Transnational National Council, as the legitimate
representative of Libya and the Libyan people (Cody 2011). Former President of the United
States Barack Obama believed that the United States should not have been involved in an Arab
civil war and that he would rely on other allies to the U.S. to make the no-fly zone happen (Cody
2011). Alain Juppe once stated that he was unhappy with the slowness of the United States
government and their difficulty in deciding and defining their stance on the issue before the
United Nations had agreed on the no-fly zone (Erlanger 2011). Juppe stated to the French
Parliament: “Never mind that there’s European impotence, but what about American power? …
The Americans haven’t yet defined their position” (Erlanger 2011). Alain Juppe’s statement
shows that there was increasing pressure on the United States government from not only France
but from those European countries that became involved in the intervention in Libya. It is also
important to note that both Great Britain and France are a part of NATO and the United Nations
Security Council alongside the United States, making the countries allies; there is a possibility
that there was a lot of influence and pressure from Britain and France in those meetings.

When the war was coming to an end former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, and
former Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Cameron, visited Tripoli, Libya and were greeted
as heroes by the Libyan people (Spencer 2011). During this visit both world leaders explained
that there was a new resolution that was being drafted by the United Nations in hopes of lifting
the arms embargo on Libya, to establish a United Nations mission in Tripoli, to gradually
unfreeze the remaining assets being held in the United States to Libya, and to lift the no-fly zone (Spencer 2011). Once NATO took control of the operation, sources say that the victory would not have been possible without the aid of the United States because they have “the intelligence assets in the sky and air-to-air refueling that is invaluable for a long-haul mission. Without the US, the whole damn thing would not have happened” (Wintour and Watt 2011).

The support from the Arab League and mainly, Amr Moussa, the Egyptian secretary general of the Arab League meant that Lebanon supported the resolution and Lebanon is the only Arab country that is a member of the United Nations Security Council (Wintour and Watt 2011). After this support, this resolution went from being about establishing a no-fly zone to “all necessary measures” (Wintour and Watt 2011). However, the Arab League stressed that there was to be no “foreign military” intervention in Libya and that the no-fly zone must be lifted as soon as the crisis was taken care of (Al Jazeera 2011). This approval by the Arab League placed a lot of pressure on not only the United States but also Europe because numerous states had stated that a no-fly zone could not be implemented without the support of the Arab Nations (Leiby and Mansour 2011). In response to the Arab League’s immediate demand for a no-fly zone, a representative from the White House stated, “we welcome this important step by the Arab League, which strengthens the international pressure on Qaddafi and support for the Libyan people...The United States will continue to advance our efforts to pressure Qaddafi, to support the Libyan opposition, and to prepare for all contingencies, in close coordination with our international partners” (Leiby and Mansour 2011). Officials of the Libyan Transnational National Council at the time welcomed the establishment of the no-fly zone which placed pressure on the United States, Europe, and the U.N. Security Council to pass the resolution and begin the process of establishment (Leiby and Mansour 2011).
Drone Program

The drone program began in 2004 under President George W. Bush’s administration. By the time President Bush left office in 2009 he had launched forty-nine drone strikes, forty-eight of which were in Pakistan and one in Yemen. These air strikes killed approximately 356 militants in the Middle East that were viewed as enemies of the United States in the war on terror. Since President Obama was inaugurated in 2009, his administration has expanded former President Bush’s covert drone program immensely and has essentially replaced the “boots on the ground” approach to fighting terrorism with the drone program. (Boyer 2013).

As of mid-April 2013, President Obama had launched approximately 379 drone strikes, which is close to eight times the amount of drone strikes launched during the Bush administration. Seventy-two of the drone strikes had taken place in Yemen and almost three thousand militants had been killed, about one thousand of which were killed in Yemen. However, under President Obama there have been numerous concerns regarding the amount of civilian deaths. The New America Foundation, a non profit think tank in Washington D.C., reported that an estimated number of 368 civilians had been killed during the United States’ drone campaign and up to 233 deaths have occurred so far during President Obama’s administration. (Boyer 2013).

President Obama’s administration has claimed that between 2009 and the end of 2015 that they had only launched 473 strikes, which killed between 2,372 and 2,581 terrorists. The administration also claimed that only between 64 and 116 civilians have died during the attacks. These numbers released by the administration, which claimed to be transparent throughout the attacks, have been under scrutiny from the media, bureaus, and senators. Spencer Ackerman
from The Guardian says that the civilian number only represents one country and leaves out three other countries that had been targeted by the United States' drone strikes. Also, the administration did not give specifics as to where the strikes had occurred. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reported that the civilian death toll during the Obama administration has been more than 800 people. However, in 2013 Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina had said that the drone strikes had killed more than 4,700 people. (Ackerman 2016). This lack of consistency in the numbers shows just how secretive the Obama administration has been with the drone program regardless of how “transparent” the administration said that they would be with the public.

In a speech given by President Barack Obama at the National Defense University in Washington D.C. he talked about drones saying that the actions taken by the United States’ government were effective in the fight on terror. He gave the example of the intelligence that was gathered from Osama bin Laden’s compound, where American forces found that bin Laden had written “We could lose the reserves to enemy’s air strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives” (2013). Different forms of communication from al-Qaeda officials had confirmed what bin Laden said as well. The president then stated that dozens of high ranking and skilled al-Qaeda officials had been taken off the battlefields due to air strikes and that numerous plots had been disrupted that targeted international flights, transit systems in the United States, numerous European cities, and American troops in Afghanistan. President Obama ended the introduction on the drone program by stating that these strikes had saved lives. President Obama continued to say that America having a legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the United States’ only reason to initiate drone strikes. (2013).
The Obama administration created the “U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities” to have a set guideline and procedure for how and when the United States could initiate the use of force, especially drone warfare. In the document it is stated that since President Obama took office in 2009 he has made it clear that the United States will use all available tools to protect the citizens of America from al-Qaeda and its associated forces’ terrorist threats. It has claimed that the most important consideration in the use of lethal force is whether or not the actions will protect American lives. The document stated that the United States will not use lethal force when it is feasible to capture a terrorist suspect, capturing a suspect gives the government the opportunity to gather intelligence and disrupt terrorist plots. (2013)

The document also laid out four specific guidelines where the use of lethal force is tolerable: first, when there is a legal basis for the use of lethal force. Second, the United States would only use lethal force against a target that is a continuous and imminent threat to United States citizens. Third, the following criteria must be met:

- near certainty that the terrorist target is present; near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed; an assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation; an assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons; and an assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to U.S. persons (USPSPUPCOOUS 2013).

Finally, when the United States uses force in foreign land, international law, respect for sovereignty and law of armed conflict, inflict constraints on the United States use of force and its ability to act unilaterally. (USPSPUPCOOUS 2013).

The administration also laid out in the document who is responsible to make the decisions to either capture the target or use force against the terrorist. Those decisions would be made at
the most senior levels of the United States government who will be informed by relevant departments and agencies. Senior national security officials will make sure that these policy standards are being met while lawyers will determine the legality of these standards. (USPSPUPCOOUS 2013). After decisions have been made, the administration briefs the relevant committees of Congress and going back to President Obama’s speech he likes to point out that Congress is briefed on every strike that the government orders and that Congress authorized the use of force in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Obama 2013).

Michael Hayden, a former Air Force Four Star General and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from 2006 to 2009, in an article for The New York Times said that the drone program worked and that it has been the most precise and effective use of firepower in the history of war and armed conflict. Not only has it disrupted terrorist plots but it has also reduced the al-Qaeda group along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to a “shell of its former self” (2016). Hayden said that drone strikes have killed high-value targets that were suspected to be at the destination of the strike but it was not certain that they were there. There have been no excuses made about killing lower-level terrorists because the government of the United States saw these actions as “legitimate acts of war against an armed enemy” and during a time of war, it is necessary to kill foot soldiers as well. Hayden states that with evidence the government gained from Osama bin Laden’s compound after he was killed, there were reports showing that the United States’ air strikes were devastating to al-Qaeda and in the end even frightened al-Qaeda because now they had to worry about their survival. At the end of his article Hayden states that even though civilians have died at the hands of these drone strikes, the death toll from terrorist attacks would have been much higher and devastating had the United States not taken action. (2016).
James Downie from *The Washington Post* believes quite the opposite of President Obama and Michael Hayden. Downie believed that President Obama's drone war will be a shameful part of the legacy he leaves as president. First, he argued that drones might not be an effective tool in the war on terrorism and that the embrace of drones had led to a preference for killing terrorist rather than capturing them for intelligence. He also said that dropping a bomb from a drone would lead to more radicalized terrorist because the strikes would be used as propaganda for the terrorist organizations. Next, Downie stated that according to leaked documents, from the Intercept website and a book written by staff members of the website titled “The Assassination Complex”, show how easy it is for an innocent civilian, who could or could not be American, to be added to the United States' government's terrorist database. (2016).

Downie also stated that according to these documents the government had severely overstated how much they follow the guidelines to authorize a strike. In 2013 Obama said that the United States would only conduct drone strikes against terrorist groups who were a continuous and imminent threat to American citizens and if there was a near certainty that no civilians would die in the process. These documents have shown that once the president has approved a strike, the Pentagon and the CIA have sixty days to act; Downie argued that sixty days would no longer be considered an imminent threat. Downie believed President Obama chose to expand the drone war under the beliefs that it was legal, moral, and good policy. However, Downie argued that that is a mistaken belief and that the drone war is an unfading and shameful legacy of his presidency. (2016).

At the end of President Obama's first term, according to a public opinion poll by Gallup, approximately two-thirds or sixty-five percent of Americans agreed with the use of drone strikes against suspected terrorists. These polls also show that the people who tend to follow the news
about the drone campaign are more willing to support the use of drones. (Brown and Newport 2013).

Do you think the U.S. government should or should not use drones to -- ?
Among national adults

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>% Yes, should</th>
<th>% No, should not</th>
<th>% No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Launch airstrikes in other countries against suspected terrorists</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch airstrikes in other countries against U.S. citizens living abroad who are suspected terrorists</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch airstrikes in the U.S. against suspected terrorists living here</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch airstrikes in the U.S. against U.S. citizens living here who are suspected terrorists</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Based on Sample A of 502 national adults
- Based on Sample B of 518 national adults

March 20-21, 2013
GALLUP

Figure 7: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup that shows what the people polled believe drones should or should not be used for.

How closely have you been following news about the U.S. government's use of unmanned military aircraft known as drones?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>National adults</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Independents</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very closely</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat closely</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not too closely</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

March 20-21, 2013
GALLUP

Figure 8: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup that shows how closely American citizens follow the news on the use of drones.
Support for Use of Drones, by How Closely Following

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very/ Somewhat closely</th>
<th>Not too closely/ Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Launch airstrikes in other countries against suspected terrorists</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch airstrikes in other countries against U.S. citizens living abroad who are suspected terrorists</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch airstrikes in the U.S. against suspected terrorists living here</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launch airstrikes in the U.S. against U.S. citizens living here who are suspected terrorists</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on Sample A of 502 national adults
** Based on Sample B of 518 national adults

March 20-21, 2013
GALLUP

Figure 9: Public opinion poll conducted by Gallup that shows the results from figures 7 and 8 combined.

In a more recent public opinion poll conducted by The Pew Research Center on the use of drones they show that public opinion on the use of drones is still high however, many civilians are worried that the use of drones are endangering the lives of innocent civilians. (Pew Research Center 2015).
Figure 10: Public opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center that shows percentages of the public that approve, disapprove, or do not have an opinion on the use of drones against extremists.

**International Pressure**

The drone program is an interesting case as it is challenging to find information relating to the use of the drones themselves and the details about airstrikes that have occurred under President Obama’s administration. It has been even more difficult to find enough information to talk about cases of airstrikes and drone usage throughout President Obama’s first term; therefore, for this case there will be an examination of the use of drones and airstrikes in the Syrian Civil War and to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant which had taken place throughout Obama’s second presidential term. This case is interesting also because it is not necessarily the United States being pressured by other countries to get involved because the airstrike operations are led by the United States but rather the United States pressuring other countries into supporting the mission in some way, shape, or form; whether it is through flying
drones and conducting airstrikes, gathering and sharing intelligence, providing planes to refill the
gas of those that are conducting the airstrikes, and etc. There have been numerous countries who
have support the United States’ use of drones and airstrikes in both Syria and Iraq including:
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Belgium, Denmark, Canada,
Germany, Australia, Egypt, Israel, Britain, France, Georgia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland (The
Associated Press 2014).

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the Gulf countries have
become some of the U.S. largest counterterrorism partners (Schulberg 2014). The Gulf States:
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar, are some of the biggest supporters
of the drone program and the airstrikes campaign because of their close relationship with the
United States. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates all heavily rely on the
United States for military support (Schulberg 2014). One of the main reasons for the
involvement of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the U.A.E is that they have been dominated by the
Sunni sector of Islam and there is this underlying fear of the Shiite regional dominance which is
mainly led by Iran (Schulberg 2014). These powerful Sunni’s in said countries have been
allocating funds to extremist militant groups who have gone against Iranian and Shiite interests,
therefore meaning that these countries have been supporting the Syrian oppositions group who
have been fighting to push President Assad out of power in Syria (Schulberg 2014). Qatar and
the U.A.E. both have airbases that are being used by the United States and other countries in
order to conduct the airstrikes in Syria against the Islamic State (The Associated Press 2014).
The U.A.E has also been allocating money and funds to the Syrian opposition groups so that they
have the ability to obtain weapons and can afford to pay their soldiers for fighting (Schulberg
2014). Bahrain is useful to the United States because the U.S. has been able to send their Navy
ships that have been involved in the airstrikes to naval bases in Bahrain (The Associated Press 2014) however, they have managed to stay out of direct intervention in Syria or Iraq (Schulberg 2014). The Saudi Arabian government offered to host United States training facilities within their country that was responsible for training thousands of Syrian rebels and opposition group members; also, the Saudi government had been allocating weapons to these opposition groups as well (Schulberg 2014).

All of the gulf countries except Qatar have participated in the airstrikes in Syria, the Pentagon has stated that Qatar has played more of a “supporting” role (The Associated Press 2014). The Qatari government has not previously explained the reasons behind their limited involvement but however, they do have the smallest military force in the Middle East which prompts the government to use more soft powers and diplomatic stances (Schulberg 2014). Qatar has a strong alliance with the United States due to its buildup of wealth from natural gas and because of its strategic location in the Middle East; the United States now has its Central Command (CENTCOM) stationed in a Qatari airbase (Schulberg 2014). Qatar also agreed and did pay for the construction of this airbase and they let the United States store and station their military equipment at the base (Schulberg 2014). Qatar’s relationship with other Middle Eastern countries is rocky. Qatar had been accused of providing funds to terrorist organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, therefore, remaining in comfortable relations with the United States would help reduce that tension and ease the minds of other Arab countries (Schulberg 2014).

Britain has also been involved in providing support to the United States by participating in the airstrike campaigns in Iraq and Syria. Between the years 2015 and 2016 Britain had expanded their involvement in the campaign by providing more aircrafts and by agreeing to
participate in airstrikes not only in Iraq but also in Syria (Cole 2016). It is obvious that Britain is
very involved in the campaign because from the beginning of the US-led campaign in 2014- June
2016, Britain had launched approximately 944 airstrikes in both Iraq and Syria (Cole 2016).
There is this constraint on British political action by the United States because the U.S. does not
want any enemy of the Syrian opposition, ISIL, President Assad, or the al-Nusra Front to win the
Syrian Civil War decisively; the U.S. government believes that a “moderate Syrian constituency”
opposed to those three groups could at some point potentially take over the Syrian capital and
government (Cockburn 2015). Not only did former Prime Minister of Britain David Cameron
believe this idea as well but also that this moderate opposition group has approximately 70,000
fighters involved, many other people believe that this is nothing but a fantasy and that it is close
to impossible placing Syria in a never ending war (Cockburn 2015).

Analysis:

When analyzing the three foreign policies discussed in this paper that were implemented
by President Barack Obama throughout his first term it is clear that two out of three of the cases
do not show any influence of public opinion being taken into consideration. The closing of
Guantanamo Bay and the United States’ intervention in Libya clearly go against the popular
demand of the public, while the expansion of the drone program tends to have more freedom in
allowing one to say that this policy could have been adopted based on the public’s supportive
opinion of the program.

First, take into consideration President Obama’s attempt to close Guantanamo Bay
prison. For the president this policy idea was more of a campaign promise, he promised to close
the prison within the first year of taking office but that never happened, eight years have passed
and the facility is still open. Why is that? That is because President Obama has faced stiff opposition not only from the public but also from Congress. Congress has passed laws and regulations that prohibit the president from moving detainees from Guantanamo Bay to prisons in the United States, which has severely hindered the president’s process in closing the prison. Aside from the heavy and certainly increasing opposition from Congress he has faced heavy opposition from the American public.

Going back to the public opinion polls conducted by both Gallup and the Pew Research Center in the closing Guantanamo Bay section, it is easy to see that President Obama is acting against popular public opinion. In Figure 1: Gallup asks the public if they believe that the United States should or should not close the Guantanamo Bay prison and move some of the prisoners to the United States’ prisons? This question was asked in both May and November of 2009 and the results stayed consistent. A majority of those polled, 65% in May and 64% in November said that the prison should not be closed nor should prisoners be moved to the United States. While in May 32% and in November 30% believed that the prison should close and prisoners transported to the U.S. There were also 3% in May and 5% in November who had no opinion on the issue at hand.

In Figure 2: the poll is a break down of the previous numbers into United States party identifications. Not surprising, over 50% of Democrats agreed with President Obama’s decision to close the prison and move some prisoners to U.S. prisons. However, approximately 30% of Independents and less than 10% of Republicans agreed with President Obama’s decision to close the Guantanamo Bay prison and move prisoners to the United States.

In Figure 3: there are two different years in which the public was polled first in November 2009 and the second in February 2012. In November 2009, the public was asked if
they agreed or disagreed with the decision to close Guantanamo Bay. In total, only 39% of those polled agreed with this decision, 18% of Republicans, 59% of Democrats, and 37% of Independents wanted to see the prison close while 49% total wanted to see the prison remain open: 75% of Republicans, 26% of Democrats, and 53% of Independents. One important aspect of the table to notice is the flip in Democrat numbers from 2009-2012. Where a majority of Democrats wanted the prison to close in 2009, according to the table a majority of the Democrats in 2012 wanted the prison to remain open. In February 2012 the population polled were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the decision to keep Guantanamo Bay open. In total, 70% agreed to keep the camp open, breaking that down into: 79% of Republicans, 61% of Democrats, and 73% of Independents. While a total of 24% wanted to close the camp: 15% of Republicans, 32% of Democrats, and 23% of Independents.

The number of Democrats, who mainly supported Democratic President Obama’s desire to close the prison, in the beginning the numbers were strong in supporting such decision. However, as time progressed into President Obama’s second term their belief in the prison actually closing declined and the Democrats began to support leaving the prison open. While throughout President Obama’s two terms in office he has continuously pushed his campaign promise and fought to close Guantanamo Bay with little success, this shows that public opinion did not influence his decision. Despite public opinion being strongly against President Obama’s decision to close the prison, he continuously pushed for the closure of Guantanamo Bay. These polls show that a majority of American citizens wanted the prison to remain open, with numbers such as: 49%, 64%, 65%, and 70% of the population polled wanting the Guantanamo Bay prison to remain open. Regardless of these numbers, President Obama, in 2016, is still striving and pushing for the closure of the facility.
The theme stays the same when it comes to the United States government’s decision to intervene in Libya in 2011. Figure 4 shows that in both March and June of 2011 Gallup polled citizens and asked them if they approved or disapproved of the United States military actions in Libya. In March 2011, Gallup reported that 47 percent of the public approved of the military action in Libya while 37 percent disapproved, and 16 percent had no opinion on the topic. However, in June 2011 when the public was asked the same question, this time only 39 percent approved of the military action in Libya while 46 percent disapproved, and 15 percent had no opinion on the topic.

Figures 5 and 6 show that the public was wary and opposed to military intervention in Libya. In Figure 5: the public was asked if they believed that the United States had a responsibility to take action in Libya and 63 percent of those asked said no, while 27 percent said yes, and 10 percent had no opinion. Figure 6 shows that the public, 51 percent, was mainly against the use of force in Libya because they believed that the United States’ military was already too overcommitted. Along with 19 percent believing that opposition groups could turn out to be no better than the current government in Libya; 13 percent believing that Libya was not of vital interest to the United States; 5 percent just did not support force; and 12 percent did not have an opinion.

While there may have been general public support for the United States’ intervention in Libya during the beginning of the campaign, it is safe to say that the public’s opinion did not play a crucial role in President Obama’s decision making on the issue. Soon after the United States became involved in Libya in March 2011, it seems as if public opinion took a turn and became less supportive of the operation. While President Obama preached that the United States has a role and a duty to act as an enforcer of global security and an activist for global peace, the
American citizens believed differently in these circumstances. According to the polls, not only did a majority of the public believe that the United States did not have a responsibility to get involved or do something about the fighting in Libya, but also they believed that the United States’ military was already overextended and overcommitted in other places around the globe. This shows that President Obama did go against public opinion because he continued to act in Libya against the general wishes of the American public.

When it comes to the implementation of the drone program by the Obama administration the results become blurred and unclear because while the public opinion polls show a majority of the American public’s support for the program, there is also speculation that by President Obama using drones in his counterterrorism policy that this could just be a continuation from the George W. Bush administration. However, while the Obama administration has claimed that they would be as transparent as possible about the drone program as to where and why force was used, there is a lot of uncertainty and unclear data on these statistics; It is evident that President Obama’s administration has conducted more air strikes than the Bush administration which could be seen as just a continuation or adoption of former President George W. Bush’s counterterrorism policy.

Throughout President Obama’s first and second terms, public support for the drone program has remained high and steady. In Figure 7: they asked the public whether or not they believed that the United States’ government should use drones to launch airstrikes in other countries against suspected terrorists. A majority of the population, 65 percent, agreed that drones should be used against suspected terrorists overseas, while 28 percent did not agree and 8 percent had no opinion. Figures 8 and 9 break down the polls into how many people support or do not support these decisions based on how closely they follow the news on such topics.
In Figure 8: the researchers asked the public, how closely they followed the news about the United States government’s use of drones. 14 percent of the national adults said very closely, 35 percent said somewhat closely, 25 percent said not too closely, and 24 percent said not at all. Figure 9 is based off of the results obtained in Figure 8. In Figure 9: Gallup asked the public, based off of how closely they were following the news, about their support for drones in different situations. The main question of focus is how many people supported the launch of airstrikes in other countries against suspected terrorists. The results are broken down into 74 percent of those who followed the news very or somewhat closely agreed that airstrikes should be used while 58 percent of those who did not follow the news too closely or not at all supported the use of drones in this situation. Figure 10 reiterates everything that was shown in the last three tables as well, that there was a majority of the public, 58 percent that supported the use of United States drone strikes against extremists.

In Robert Putnam’s “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games” (1988), he said that the government has a responsibility of appeasing both the diplomats and the domestic groups when it comes to foreign policy and international negotiations. According to Putnam, domestic groups will pursue their interest by putting pressure on the government to adopt policies that are ideal to the public and domestic groups (1988). If we look at the results from Guantanamo Bay and the intervention in Libya, we can see, through the public opinion polls, that the public indeed did put pressure on the government to see their most favorable results but the government did not react in the publics’ favor.

Putnam states, “Involuntary defection instead reflects the behavior of an agent who is unable to deliver on a promise because of failed ratification [of Level II]” (1988). Level II can represent bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or even “public opinion” (1988).
If we look at the results from Guantanamo Bay it verifies Putnam’s statement. President Obama’s campaign promise to close Guantanamo Bay by the end of his first year in office was halted because a majority of the American public and Congress disagreed with this policy decision. Therefore, President Obama’s administration has not been able to move forward with the closure of the Guantanamo Bay prison because of this stiff opposition, meaning that he has not been able to fulfill or deliver his campaign promise to the public.

Further along in Putnam’s article he states, “The composition of the active Level II constituency…also varies with the politicization of the issue...this is one reason why most professional diplomats emphasize the value of secrecy to successful negotiations” (1988). This idea can also be used to explain the situation between President Obama’s administration’s continuation of the drone program and how the administration conveys the results of these airstrikes to the public. If we look at the public opinion results of the drone program, they show that the public is mainly in support of the use of drones against suspected terrorists. President Obama’s administration has claimed that they have been as open and transparent with public on the use of drones as much as they possibly can be. However, it is clear that the administration has been secretive and non-transparent with the results of the drone strike because there are no clear statistics on how many airstrikes have been launched, deaths of both civilians and suspected terrorists, and who or what these strikes have targeted. This secrecy from the government can be strategic to the administration because it is possible that if the public was aware of these statistics that maybe they would not be as in favor of the drone program as they are without knowing the exact statistics or details of the results of the program.

Another idea, in reference to Putnam’s paper, especially when looking at the intervention in Libya, is that the United States has a certain image that the country wants to project and reflect
internationally. For example, in President Obama’s arguments to get involved in Libya, the president claimed that the United States is an anchor for global security and is an advocate for global human freedom. With Putnam’s two-level domestic and international game in mind, it could be taken into consideration that President Obama and his administration are attempting to keep this international appearance afloat, even if that means having to go against the wishes and demands of the domestic population.

Since public opinion was not a key factor in President Obama’s foreign policy decision-making process, President Obama’s policies did not meet Robert Putnam’s criteria of domestic influence in the Two Level Game Theory. Putnam expects that the domestic level of the two level game will ratify and support the decisions made at the international level, therefore benefiting both levels of the game since both the domestic and the international levels would be receiving what they bargained for. The cases of Guantanamo Bay and the intervention in Libya supported the hypothesis because even though public opinion was strongly against closing the prison and getting involved in the war in Libya, the Obama Administration continuously pursued its support for these policies regardless of the public’s opinion and desires; therefore going against the ideas of Putnam. With the drone program, there was strong support from the public and internationally for using and continuing the drone program in fighting terrorism. Therefore, the drone program is the only case where the support from the domestic level aligned with the support from the international level, as predicted by Robert Putnam’s two level game theory.

There was strong international pressure on the United States government in the case of Guantanamo Bay. Throughout my research, information was found where there were over twenty countries, international organizations, and international diplomatic figures that directly spoke out against the United States government for not having closed the detention facility.
Therefore, President Obama was continuously pressured by international organizations and actors to close Guantanamo Bay, there was also even more pressure because a lot of these opposes claimed that the United States was hypocritical. Many argued that while the United States is seen as an advocate for human rights and human freedoms worldwide, the government was violating these very beliefs in their own detention facilities where they were torturing detainees and stripping them of their rights, such as to a fair trial. Therefore, there was a lot of pressure and strain placed on the United States government to close Guantanamo Bay from international actors but there was stiff opposition from the domestic population in the United States where a majority of the population wanted the camp to remain open and operational.

In the case of the Libyan intervention in 2011, there was a tremendous amount of opposition from the United States citizens, as in they did not want to get involved in an Arab civil war. However, there was a lot of pressure from the international sectors. France and Great Britain were the spearheads of the campaign in Libya; the two countries have a lot of opportunities to pressure the United States into involvement considering all three countries are members of the U.N. Security Council and NATO. The French government was relentless in getting the United States to participate; the former President Nicolas Sarkozy consistently called out the United States for being too vague in their position in the opposition. There was also a lot of pressure coming from the Arab League, a twenty-two member organization, even though at the time there was twenty-one because Libya was excluded during the time of the Libyan civil war. There was this expectation of the United States getting involved because of the humanitarian violations that were being committed in Libya at the time and considering that the United States actively advocates for human rights, it was only expected for the United States to willing jump in, but that was not the case.
The drone program is the only case where Robert Putnam’s case is proven because here there is a strong support at home and internationally. As it was hard to find information on President Obama’s administration’s use of drones and airstrikes throughout his first term, this study focused on the use of drones in the Syrian civil war in the fight against President Assad and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. This was a U.S.-led campaign and there was strong support from the citizens in the United States and support from countries internationally to use drones to fight terrorism and an oppressive regime. In this case rather than there being strong pressures on the United States to get involved, there were strong pressures on foreign countries, especially some of the Gulf States, to get involved on behalf of the United States. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar are all strategically located countries for the United States and it is important that there remains good relationships between the U.S. and these Gulf States as they both rely on one another for military, counterterrorism, and stability purposes. These four countries were easily susceptible to potential terrorism threats at home and instability and the United States provides these countries with the support and counterbalance in the Middle East that they need therefore, it is important that they support and do what the United States feels is best for the region.

**Conclusion**

While public opinion did not have a major influence on President Barack Obama’s foreign policy decisions when it comes to the “closing” of Guantanamo Bay, the United States’ intervention in Libya, and the continuation of the drone program, there were strong international pressures placed on the United States and other countries that influenced the government’s decisions. Therefore, in two out of the three cases Robert Putnam’s theory was not supported
because while the international level was supportive of the policies, the public was not, especially in the case of Guantanamo Bay where neither the public nor Congress would approve of President Obama’s decision to close the facility. It could be argued in future research that since there is belief by scholars that there is an overall lack in understanding of how public opinion affects American foreign policy because the public is disengaged and uneducated on foreign issues and that the role of media influences the public’s attitude towards a certain issue, then there is no need to let the public’s opinion on foreign policy determine diplomacy and to just focus on the international context of diplomacy.

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